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ARTICLES
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AS SIGNALING
AND CO-OPTATION
Roy Shapira*
This Article provides a new perspective on corporate philanthropy by
examining a previously unnoticed mechanism through which corporate prosociality enhances firm value: signaling. In particular, cash donations can
signal financial strength. A substantial and unexpected increase in the
level of cash donations can signal that a firm’s insiders perceive the
company’s future to be good enough to spend ultra-discretionary funds on
unrelated third parties. The first contribution of this Article is in shifting
focus from the traditional “buying goodwill” explanation for corporate
philanthropy (i.e., companies engage in pro-social sacrifices because
stakeholders are willing to pay more for corporate goodness) to a signaling
explanation (i.e., pro-social sacrifices mitigate asymmetric information
about a firm’s fundamentals).
But corporate philanthropy is not
unequivocally good for the company. This is where the Article’s second
contribution comes in: examining the conditions under which corporate
philanthropy decreases firm value. Under certain circumstances, managers
can use their discretion over pro-social expenditures to co-opt corporate
governance mechanisms, thereby increasing the level of agency costs. This
occurs, for example, when managers cause companies to donate to
charitable causes affiliated with independent directors. The Article next
evaluates the legal implications of corporate philanthropy. In particular,
the theoretical arguments presented here on how philanthropy can be good
(signaling) or bad (co-optation) for the company strengthen the case for
introducing some form of mandatory disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate pro-sociality is an important and growing phenomenon.
Corporate behaviors that do not directly benefit the company or meet legal
requirements—such as moving to greener production, being employeefriendly, or donating to charitable causes—affect not only social and
environmental causes, but also financial allocations. Indeed, over three
trillion dollars are currently invested in part on the basis of corporate social
performance. 1
Yet despite its growing importance, corporate pro-sociality remains an
elusive phenomenon. This is especially true in the corporate and securities
law literature where, instead of understanding the causes and consequences
of pro-social profit sacrificing, commentators traditionally focus their
attention on the endless normative debate over whether corporations should

1. See Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States, SOC. INV.
FORUM 8 (2010), http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf.
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engage in non-maximizing activities.2 Even when the focus is shifted to
understanding why companies behave pro-socially, the discussion
anachronistically alludes to the market forces driving corporate prosociality, without attempting to understand what affects those market
forces. In particular, one needs to consider how the current legal regime
impacts market incentives to engage in pro-sociality. This Article aims to
bridge these gaps by advancing our understanding of why companies
engage in pro-sociality and how the law should regulate it.
Before we begin our analysis, it is useful to resist the traditional tendency
to treat various behaviors grouped under the umbrella term Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) as if they present the same descriptive and
normative issues. In reality, different pro-social expenditures serve
different purposes and target different audiences. This Article focuses on
the subset of CSR that is called corporate philanthropy (CP), which
involves explicit pro-social spending. CP is defined as corporate donations
to qualified (i.e., tax-exempt) charitable organizations. My focus, then, will
be behaviors that are more explicitly non-maximizing. More precisely, I
will not focus on behaviors like treating employees nicely, where the
expenditures are on the immediate corporate realm (operational profit
sacrificing), or on behaviors like cause-related marketing or corporate
sponsorships of sports events, which are more akin to traditional
advertising. By contrast, CP lacks expectations for an immediate, direct
quid pro quo. Such a narrow definition has several advantages. First, it
will allow us to resist “fighting the hypothetical,” that is, evading issues
arising from profit sacrificing by assuming that the behavior is really profit
maximizing in disguise. Second, focusing on this extreme example of prosociality also allows us to extrapolate to other, less extreme behaviors along
the non-maximizing spectrum. Finally, in the debate over the proper
purpose of the corporation, CP is the example traditionally used in the legal
literature. It is therefore fitting to revisit it by freshly examining the
assumptions that commentators made in that normative debate.3
Current accounts of CP fall under two main categories: the profitenhancing approach, which construes CP as buying goodwill for the
company, and the agency costs approach, which views CP as a managerial
perk. Both accounts suffer from under-articulation. They do not clearly
identify the mechanisms linking CP with enhanced profits or managerial
agency costs. This inadequacy of current explanations may be responsible
for CP laws’ evolution into a regulatory vacuum. Since the mid-twentieth
century, decision makers have been afforded wide discretion to sacrifice
profits in the public interest, while no protective mechanism—notably, no
2. See generally A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
3. On the need to study individual components of CSR separately and the advantages
of focusing on the CP component, see, for example, Baruch Lev et al., Is Doing Good Good
for You? How Corporate Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue Growth, 31
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 182 (2010). For the terminology I adopt here, see Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
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disclosure requirement—applies.
This legal treatment may be a
consequence of viewing the buying goodwill mechanism as extremely
simple: companies donate because stakeholders like the fact that companies
donate. Companies can increase profits by acting philanthropically, and if
CP increases profits, then there is no need to intervene. Nonexistent legal
regulation may also be a consequence of a simplified view of the critical
accounts of CP as agency costs. The agency approach assumes that
managers will always have some discretionary resources to spend as they
wish, as totally eliminating agency costs is simply too costly (monitoring
managers is imperfect). Given this level of discretionary resources at the
managers’ disposal, it should be of no consequence to shareholder value
whether managers choose to spend on their preferred charity or on traveling
in luxurious company jets. Moreover, the understanding goes, these
expenditures are insignificant in dollar terms and thus do not merit
intervention.
The main contribution of this Article is to change the perspective of
current value-enhancing accounts of CP. We cannot simply assume that
companies, by acting nicely, can increase consumers’ or employees’
willingness to pay. The necessary conditions underlying this theory are
simply too unrealistic. For one, consumers have to be aware of companies’
CP policies and be willing to pay to delegate their philanthropy (that is, pay
for someone else’s charitable preferences). We should focus less on
charitable preferences and warm-glow concepts (cognitive and emotional
aspects), and more on image considerations: what information do
observing outsiders get when companies significantly increase their prosocial expenditures?
Explicit sacrifices of profits can serve as costly signals. They reliably
convey messages about attributes that are important to shareholders,
consumers, and employees, who are evaluating whether to invest in, buy
products from, or work for those companies. To illustrate, I elaborate on
the option of CP as a type of a costly signal to investors. An increase in the
level of donations could convey messages about financial strength to
potential investors, who could infer that future free cash flows are perceived
by insiders to be relatively high, that the company is now less financially
constrained, or that the riskiness of future cash flows has decreased.
My CP-as-signaling-to-investors account is the first elaborate treatment
of such a signaling story. Other signaling stories are also plausible. For
example, pro-sociality could bridge asymmetric information between
insiders and non-financial stakeholders, such as employees and consumers.
In those contexts, CP could reliably convey messages about the styles and
characteristics of top management, such as their personal preferences, the
extent to which they are subject to “short-termism,” and their commitment
to a certain corporate culture. Acknowledging the possibility that benefits
arise from signaling also has legal implications: laws affect the flow and
quality of information, as well as the choice of signals.
This Article next offers a more modest contribution to the agency costs
literature on CP. Even if we assume that CP decisions are driven by
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managerial utility, it is unclear whether they are detrimental to shareholder
value or merely a value-neutral diversion (i.e., a substitute for other
managerial perks within a fixed level of appropriation). The interesting
question, then, is not whether managerial utility drives some CP decisions;
it probably does. Rather, the question is whether giving managers wide
discretion over pro-social expenditures affects the level of overall
appropriation. I endeavor to show that insiders have both the will and the
means to strategically select the levels and targets of corporate charity in
order to covertly bypass mechanisms that are supposed to cap managerial
agency costs. Donations to directors’ pet charities can co-opt board
independence. Donations to certain educational charities can influence
politicians and policies, resulting in a sub-optimal level of shareholder
protection. Spending on certain environmental or social agendas can help
managers create coalitions with activist groups, thereby entrenching
themselves and sub-optimally reducing CEO turnover. The upshot is that
some sort of legal intervention may be needed. Leaving agency problems
totally unregulated in the CP context could create negative spillovers in
other contexts.
With these theoretical contributions in mind, I move to policy
implications: rethinking the laws of corporate pro-social profit sacrificing.4
My primary contribution here is in strengthening the case for disclosure.
Stressing the importance of informational benefits to those donations driven
by value enhancement focuses our attention on how the current regulatory
vacuum leads to an uninformative environment full of cheap talk.
Regulating some standardized, comparable, subject-to-liability form of
disclosure could be good for the market by increasing awareness and
mitigating asymmetric information. This form of disclosure could also be
good for the non-profit sector by allowing companies to focus on real
impact, rather than marketing.
At the same time, exploiting the potential to use undisclosed CP to co-opt
governance mechanisms stresses the importance of not leaving CP in the
dark. In this respect, legal intervention should focus not only on the levels
of pro-sociality, but also on its targets. I then tie the discussion to the
related, timely topic of corporate political donations laws, which are
currently in flux.5 I argue that, unlike in the political donations context,
there is no need to introduce more intrusive protective mechanisms, such as
a shareholder vote, for “regular” donations.
Why is it so important to understand CP behavior? After all, CP is
“merely” one percent of corporate pretax profits, and five percent of overall

4. I do not offer a fully detailed blueprint for reform. Rather, I sketch the initial
implications of my analysis.
5. A 2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision relaxed existing restrictions on political
spending. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83,
97 n.38 (2010) (referring to proposed legislation before Congress).
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giving in the U.S. 6 My answer is that CP is a practically important, timely,
and theoretically interesting issue. Donations from corporations amount to
around sixteen billion dollars per year. 7 That is hardly pocket change for
investors, not to mention the impact it has on social institutions (by
supporting, for example, the arts and the healthcare sector). More
important, understanding what drives this unusual corporate behavior can
serve as a starting point for understanding much larger phenomena, lumped
under the term CSR, which impact trillions of dollars. 8 CP is also a timely
topic, if only because the regulatory overhaul of corporate political
donations needs to take into account the subtle ways in which CP can be
used to influence policies. If you regulate explicit channels only, leaving
implicit ones untouched, then the goals of regulation may be frustrated.
Finally, a better understanding of CP can be of theoretical interest. The
exception could tell us something about the rule. If the rule is that
corporations are single-minded profit maximizers, then delineating the
exceptions to this rule—such as how and when its limits are crossed—can
tell us a lot about corporations and their functions in society.
Some notes on scope and terminology are in order. First, I will deal
mostly with “direct” corporate giving, as opposed to giving through
corporate foundations. 9 Second, unless otherwise stated, my analysis will
deal with large public companies.
Finally, I use terms such as
“philanthropy” without purporting to make statements about the noble inner
motives of the giver. Rather, I will focus on inputs and outputs; that is, the
fact that the company gives its money in a way that promotes others’
wealth.
Part I of this Article is a survey of the CP literature. Part II introduces
my signaling theory of CP. Part III clarifies whether and how CP could be
a corporate governance problem. Part IV deals with policy implications,
surveying current laws and evaluating proposals to introduce mechanisms
that will protect shareholders’ interests from managerial abuse of CP.

6. See GIVING USA FOUND. & CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV., GIVING USA
2011: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2010, at 104, 106 (2011)
[hereinafter GIVING USA 2011].
7. See id. at 4.
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9. Giving through foundations raises substantially different questions than direct
giving. Direct giving is a bigger phenomenon (foundation giving comprises 25 to 30 percent
of overall CP), so it makes sense to focus on it. See infra note 10 and accompanying text. A
corporate foundation is an entity established by the company that qualifies under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) as a charitable organization for tax-exemption purposes. Companies can transfer
CP money to their foundations, and the latter decide on when, how much, and to whom to
donate. See generally Natalie J. Webb, Corporate Profits and Social Responsibility:
“Subsidization” of Corporate Income Under Charitable Giving Tax Laws, 48 J. ECON. &
BUS. 401 (1996).
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I. CURRENT TAKES ON CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: DATA AND THEORY
A. Existing Data
This section situates the CP phenomenon by addressing the following
questions: How much do companies give? To whom? What do they give,
cash or products? Is CP good on average for the financial bottom line?
Under what firm-specific conditions are CP levels high, and under what
conditions is CP value enhancing? Specifically, do firms with strong
governance mechanisms give more or less?
1. Putting Corporate Philanthropy in Perspective:
The “On Aggregate” Data
American companies spend approximately fifteen to sixteen billion
dollars annually on philanthropy. 10 In relative terms, CP amounts to one
percent of corporate pre-tax profits. 11 While the absolute amounts increase
over time, donations as a percentage of profits remain somewhat stable,
around one percent. At the industry level, pharmaceutical companies give
the most. At the firm level, the biggest product donors (Pfizer, Oracle)
evaluate their contributions in billions,12 while the biggest cash donors
(Wal-Mart, Bank of America) each donates around 300 million dollars
annually. 13 Among the Fortune 100 companies, the median giving is
around fifty million dollars annually.
Corporations also must decide what to give and to whom. Cash
donations have traditionally been the dominant form of giving, but in recent
years, there has been a movement toward in-kind donations (for example,
products or employees’ time), especially among pharmaceutical and
technology companies.14 The beneficiaries of CP vary, most notably by
industry. The healthcare sector gets the biggest share of CP, which relies
primarily on the big pharmaceutical donors; followed by educational
organizations, which rely primarily on the big technology donors.15
Another interesting pattern is that corporations give very little to religious
organizations—all the more notable when compared with individual giving
patterns, where the largest share goes to religious causes. 16

10. See GIVING USA 2011, supra note 7, at 4. Throughout this section, I rely on the
notable private aggregator of CP crude numbers: Giving USA, researched and written by the
Center of Philanthropy at Indiana University (which also surveys other sources). Data in this
section come from the Giving USA 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 annual reviews.
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., id. at 117.
13. See id. at 118.
14. See, e.g., id. at 117.
15. Cf. id. at 108.
16. See id. at 76.
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Who decides CP policy? It seems that despite a recent trend to put CP
policy in the hands of specialized departments and professionals, CEOs still
exert a lot of influence over these discretionary expenditures.17
2. Does Social Performance Lead to Better Financial Performance?
The “On Average” Data
These facts can help us understand the basic contours of the
phenomenon, but we need to know more about CP in order to properly
evaluate it. Specifically, is CP economically grounded? That is, does
giving affect the financial bottom line, and if so, how?
There is voluminous literature studying the link between corporate social
performance and corporate financial performance. A recent meta-analysis
summarized the overarching patterns: there is a small but positive
association between social and financial performance; this association is
stronger for CP than for other social performance proxies (such as corporate
policies and transparency); and the link from financial to social
performance is at least as strong as the reverse (i.e., doing well enables
doing good; companies that generate more profits can afford to sacrifice
more profits in the public interest).18 The main lesson from this metaanalysis is that, while we cannot conclude that companies do well by doing
good, we can conclude that companies can both do well and do good. In
other words, there is no evident financial punishment for pro-sociality. 19
3. When Does Social Performance Lead to Better Financial Performance?
The Cross-Sectional Data
We need to go beyond studies on the link between giving and having to
thoroughly evaluate corporate pro-sociality. Specifically, instead of
fruitlessly trying to prove that a strategy (in our case, pro-sociality) is
generically good for the bottom line, one should try to identify the
conditions under which CP increases or decreases the value of the
company. 20
17. This is notable when considering the relatively small size of such expenditures.
CEOs of large companies do not exert such influence on equivalent expenditures. See Jayne
W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives’ Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147, 1157–60 (1997); Jaepil Choi & Heli Wang, The Promise of a
Managerial Values Approach to Corporate Philanthropy, 75 J. BUS. ETHICS 345, 349, 351
(2007).
18. See generally Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does It Pay to Be Good? A Meta-Analysis
and Redirection of Research on the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial
Performance 59 tbl.3 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://stakeholder.bu.
edu/docs/walsh,%20jim%20does%20it%20pay%20to%20be%20good.pdf.
19. This is true only to a certain point. Companies cannot heavily sacrifice profits and
still do well, as pro-sociality’s impact on financial performance will follow some inverse-U
shaped form. See Amir Barnea & Amir Rubin, Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict
Between Shareholders, 97 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 72 (2010); Heli Wang et al., Too Little or Too
Much? Untangling the Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy and Firm Financial
Performance, 19 ORG. SCI. 143, 146–47 (2008).
20. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 33 (2005); Ray Fisman et al.,
Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good? 8 (2005) (unpublished
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For purposes of this Article, studies linking the quality of corporate
governance mechanisms and CP behavior are the most interesting. In
theory, if there is a positive correlation between strong governance and CP,
then the profit-enhancing approach is supported, and the need for legal
intervention decreases. If there is a positive correlation between weak
governance and CP, then the agency costs approach is supported, and the
need for intervention increases. Yet so far, empirical studies linking
governance to CP remain largely inconclusive and open to interpretation.
CP levels positively correlate with some proxies for weak monitoring (for
example, firms with low debt ratios donate more),21 while negatively
correlating with others (firms with more independent boards donate
more).22 To make things more complicated, other conditions that are
unrelated to governance or agency costs were also found to predict CP
levels. Some of those predictors—like advertising intensity, research and
development expenditures, and labor intensity—lend support to the profitenhancing approach.23 But other predictors—notably, the fact that firms
with fewer financial constraints donate more24—introduce causation issues
that further complicate the analysis.
A better theoretical understanding and better data could one day lead to
more conclusive findings. But there is a possibility that mixed evidence
portrays the reality: CP is a bag of mixed motivations. “Bad” motivations
may bring positive spillover effects (such that managerial utility-driven
decisions can still buy some goodwill with consumers), and good

manuscript),
available
at
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/jfi/pdf/corporate.social.
responsibility.pdf.
21. See generally Barbara R. Bartkus et al., Governance and Corporate Philanthropy:
Restraining Robin Hood?, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 319 (2002) (large blockholders and institutional
investors curtail high levels of CP); William O. Brown et al., Corporate Philanthropic
Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 855, 857–58 (2006).
22. See Brown et al., supra note 21, at 857–58 (noting that board independence is
positively correlated with CP); Jordi Surroca & Josep A. Tribó, Managerial Entrenchment
and Corporate Social Performance, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 748 (2008) (noting that board
independence is positively correlated with corporate social performance in general); Maretno
A. Harjoto & Hoje Jo, Why Do Firms Engage in Corporate Social Responsibility? (2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.eben.gr/site/Papers/Maretno%20Harjoto
%20WHY%20DO%20FIRMS%20ENGAGE%20IN%20CORPORATE%20SOCIAL%20R
ESPONSIBILITY.pdf (same). Another study found no support for the hypothesis that the
duality of CEOs (when sitting as chairpersons of boards) is positively correlated with CP, or
for the hypothesis that CEO ownership levels are negatively correlated with CP. See Bartkus
et al., supra note 21, at 332.
23. See generally Brown et al., supra note 21, at 868–75; Peter Navarro, Why Do
Corporations Give to Charity?, 61 J. BUS. 65, 90 (1988). Firm size is another common
variable that is often discussed. For example, a recent study identified a cubic relationship:
the largest and smallest firms donate a larger share of their taxable income. See Louis H.
Amato & Christie H. Amato, The Effects of Firm Size and Industry on Corporate Giving, 72
J. BUS. ETHICS 229, 229–30 (2007).
24. See generally Harrison G. Hong et al., Financial Constraints on Corporate Goodness
31 tbl.3 (Jan. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1734164.
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motivations may bring negative spillover effects.25 This Article attempts to
resolve these seemingly conflicting patterns.
4. Problems and Gaps in Existing Data
I approach the data cited in this part with much caution and skepticism.
Data are often second-hand, self-reported, distorted, and incomplete, and
the corresponding methods are unable to overcome these deficiencies.26
Sources of data are especially problematic. American firms are not
required to make information on their CP policies available to the public,
and although firms must detail their tax-exempt donations, the IRS only
releases aggregate data to the public because of privacy considerations.
Most empirical studies thus rely either on voluntary CSR reports published
by the firms, annual surveys by directories and magazines, or “social
rating” agencies. Voluntary CSR reports are not subject to any comparable
standard form or to any threat of liability. Accordingly, insiders have
incentives to exaggerate positive elements and to hide negative ones. These
reports usually encompass dozens of pages of anecdotes replete with
pictures of smiling faces, making it difficult to generate hard, quantifiable,
meaningful information.27 Relying on surveys is also problematic, as they
suffer from social-desirability bias and high non-response rates. Companies
can stop reporting or responding to surveys at will, or alter the form and
scope of their disclosure when they think that complete disclosure could
hurt them. This undoubtedly limits the applicability of empirical findings.28
Finally, aggregations of data by information intermediaries (for example,
social rating agencies) also suffer from basic flaws. First, the market for
corporate social performance information is characterized by a cacophony
of indices, each measuring a different aspect, but also measuring similar
aspects differently.29 Second, these intermediaries rely mostly on voluntary
information reported by the firms, without superior access to relevant
information. Third, the reliability and comparability of this information is
hampered by under-theorizing problems, such as conflating distinct social
performance dimensions.30 Indeed, recent systematic empirical studies of
25. See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market
for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 580 (2009).
26. See Donna J. Wood, Measuring Corporate Social Performance: A Review, 12 INT’L
J. MGMT. REVS. 50, 62 (2010).
27. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 20, at 67–68 (noting that reports are overwhelming and
distorted); id. at 39 (the threat of legal liability for misinformation is non-existent); Li-Wen
Lin, Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure in Emerging Securities Markets, 35
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 14 & n.55 (2009).
28. See, e.g., James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta, Taxes and Corporate Charity:
Empirical Evidence from Micro-level Panel Data, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 193, 202 (1996).
29. See Aaron Chatterji & David Levine, Breaking Down the Wall of Codes: Evaluating
Non-financial Performance Measurement, 48 CAL. MGMT. REV. 29, 30 (2006); Michael E.
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage
and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 81 (“[T]he existing
cacophony of self-appointed scorekeepers does little more than add to the confusion.”).
30. See Jean-Pascal Gond & Andrew Crane, Corporate Social Performance Disoriented:
Saving the Lost Paradigm?, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 677, 684–85 (2010); see also supra note 3 and
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social ratings question the ability of such sources to provide real
transparency.31
Aside from data limitations, the empirical literature also suffers in
methodology and theory.32 Because CSR has always been difficult to
specify and operationally define, studies vary widely in their use of
measures, and many stay at a high level of aggregation. Lumping together
different dimensions makes it difficult to generate applicable insights, as
CSR activities are in all likelihood audience specific, and cater to different
demands. This is especially true for CP, which is an extremely distinct
dimension.33 There is also a related lack of articulation of causal
mechanisms; studies are plagued by endogeneity problems and fail to
control for important variables and spuriousness.34
In summary, our knowledge of CP practices consists of a high level of
generality. We know that CP is neither a huge nor an insignificant
corporate expenditure, that top managers exert a lot of influence over these
ultra-discretionary expenditures, that there is no evidence that pro-sociality
is being punished financially, and that conditions leading to more giving or
more profit-minded giving are hard to identify. Mainly, we know that we
do not know much. Clearly, we need a better understanding of the
mechanisms that might link CP to outcomes that are good or bad for the
company, as well as better access to reliable and comparable information.

accompanying text. To illustrate: the most widely used database is that of KLD’s Socrates,
which categorizes corporate social performance into seven subgroups. CP studies use the
subgroup of “community,” which lumps together and gives equal weight to several different
aspects: not only levels of CP, but also highly subjective and less relevant measurements
such as whether the giving is “innovative” and whether the company supports housing
projects. Thus, if company X donates 5 percent of its profits to charity, it might still end up
with a lower/equal score compared to company Y, which donates 0.5 percent of profits but
targets housing solutions. Aside from lumping, the measures themselves are inevitably
crude; to score “1” and not “0,” companies need to give above 1.5 percent of pretax income
for the preceding three years. Thus, company X that donates around 1 percent regularly
(which amounts to tens of millions of dollars annually) would get the same score as
company Y which does not engage in CP at all.
31. See generally Aaron K. Chatterji et al., How Well Do Social Ratings Actually
Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 125 (2009).
32. See Margolis et al., supra note 18, at 27–28; Brandon Vaidyanathan, Corporate
Giving: A Literature Review, SCI. GENEROSITY 31–34 (2008), http://generosityresearch.
nd.edu/assets/17636/corporate_giving_final.pdf.
33. On the misguided tendency to lump together all CSR expenditures, see Gerwin Van
der Laan et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: An Extended Stakeholder
Theory, and Empirical Test with Accounting Measures, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 299 (2007);
see also Jennifer C. Chen et al., Corporate Charitable Contributions: A Corporate Social
Performance or Legitimacy Strategy?, 82 J. BUS. ETHICS 131 (2008) (showing weak
correlations between CP and other CSR expenditures); Fisman et al., supra note 20 (same).
34. See, e.g., Choi & Wang, supra note 17 (managerial values can drive both variables);
Margolis et al., supra note 18, at 27.
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B. Existing Theory
Milton Friedman’s credo continues to be the benchmark for accounts of
CP: “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”35
Managers engaging in profit sacrificing are seen in this view as taking
money away from shareholders and imposing a tax on them. If managers
cannot put this money to good business use, the argument goes, they should
pay out to shareholders who could then decide how to satisfy their own
individual charitable preferences.
From this starting point, theoretical accounts of CP can be divided into
three categories. First, CP is profit-enhancing (however indirectly or
intertemporally), rather than profit-sacrificing. This approach attacks
assumptions, implicit in Friedman’s analysis, that social and economic
performances are unrelated and that corporations cannot satisfy charitable
preferences better than individuals. 36 Second, CP is managerial utilitydriven. This approach develops Friedman’s conjectures that CP cannot
really be characterized as an irrational sacrifice, because expenditures on
charity are rather extra-rational. They are chosen not so much for the
benefits they bring to the company, as for the benefits they bring to the
agent, the manager. Third, CP is a moral duty. This approach talks past
Friedman’s critique; yes, CP may be profit-sacrificing, but that is fine.
Companies should do more than just maximize their profits; they should
also do good for society. 37 Critiques of those different theories are
countless. For brevity’s sake, I focus on the most prevalent profitenhancing and agency costs versions. 38
1. Corporate Philanthropy as Profit Enhancing
This “win-win” or “dual agenda” approach to corporate pro-sociality
suggests that sacrificing profits in the public interest is actually efficiency
enhancing: doing well by doing good. Various nonexclusive mechanisms
are typically offered to link pro-sociality and the financial bottom line.
Two notable categories are, first, delegated philanthropy, which sacrifices
profits to meet the charitable preferences of stakeholders, thus increasing
demand or reducing operating costs; and second, long-term benefits, which
refers to sacrificing profits in the short term to increase value over the long
35. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133–34 (2d ed. 1982).
36. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate
Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 58–59.
37. See generally Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 81–85
(1995); Bill Shaw & Fredrick R. Post, A Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12 J. BUS.
ETHICS 745, 747–50 (1993).
38. We will not deal with the “moral duty” approach, as it is normative more than
descriptive. To the extent that it aims to describe the phenomenon, it collapses into agency
explanations. It is the decision maker, after all, who decides what the morally right thing to
do is. In making this choice, I follow the excellent overview of Roland Bénabou & Jean
Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 ECONOMICA 1 (2010).
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term. 39 The latter approach treats profit sacrificing as a way to run the
company; it is a distinctive resource with actual effects (for example,
treating employees nicely). The delegated philanthropy approach, by
contrast, focuses on appearance regardless of the actual effects of doing
good. 40
To understand the delegated philanthropy approach, the key is to assume
that stakeholders have some charitable preferences. Stakeholders prefer
“nice” companies—that is, companies that sacrifice profits in the public
interest. For example, consumers are assumed to perceive pro-social
corporate behavior as adding a favorable attribute to the products of the
donating company. 41 Corporations that spend on pro-sociality simply cater
to consumer demand. These corporations offer a bundle of direct utility
from consuming, and “warm glow” from buying, products that were
manufactured by nice companies. 42
Those key assumptions may be too unrealistic to predict actual behavior
accurately, however. First, while some survey and experimental evidence
shows increased willingness to pay for nicer companies’ products, evidence
of actual buying decisions is rather tenuous. 43 Second, even if you believe
that declarations in surveys do translate into actions, you cannot conclude
that CP is especially effective at buying goodwill. Consumers profess
much stronger preferences for other pro-social expenditures, such as labor
and environmental issues, than for cash donations. 44 Third, it cannot be
assumed that consumers are aware of different levels of CP. This
assumption could hold for certain cause-related marketing programs, such
as when a product’s package advertises the percentage of revenues that will
go to charity from each sale, but not for “classical” donations. 45 Finally,
39. See id. at 9–11.
40. See Margolis et al., supra note 18, at 7–8.
41. Similar stories are told about other stakeholders, including financial ones (firms offer
a bundle of warm glow and financial returns on investment). See, e.g., Joshua Graff Zivin &
Arthur Small, A Modigliani-Miller Theory of Altruistic Corporate Social Responsibility, 5
TOPICS ECON. ANAL. & POL’Y, no. 1, 2005, at 1.
42. See Ray Fisman et al., A Model of Corporate Philanthropy 2 (2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/1331.pdf (providing a
concise description followed by a critique). The concept of warm glow denotes the boost to
direct private utility people experience from acts of giving (regardless of the actual effects on
recipients or the total supply of charity). See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and
Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 466–68
(1990).
43. See VOGEL, supra note 20, at 46–47; Porter & Kramer, supra note 29, at 83. But see
Daniel W. Elfenbein & Brian McManus, A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence
that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 28
(2010) (study indicating that an eBay charity auction will yield higher prices than an
equivalent non-charity auction).
44. See, e.g., Amato & Amato, supra note 23, at 229; Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 38,
at 14; Linda Sugin, Encouraging Corporate Charity, 26 VA. TAX REV. 125, 127 n.5, 141
n.43 (2006).
45. See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 20, at 52; Sankar Sen et al., The Role of Corporate
Social Responsibility in Strengthening Multiple Stakeholder Relationships: A Field
Experiment, 34 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 158, 163–64 (2006) (noting that consumer
awareness of CP is low).
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even if consumers have meaningful charitable preferences, and even if they
are willing and able (i.e., aware of CP levels) to act upon them, one still
needs to explain why consumers would want to delegate charity. Instead of
paying more for a nice company’s product, consumers can pay for a valueadjusted cheaper product of a non-sacrificing firm. Consumers can then use
the cash saved to satisfy their own charitable preferences, which, in all
likelihood, differ somewhat from those of the donating company’s
managers. A possible rebuttal is that, in some circumstances, companies
are better positioned to bundle direct utility with warm glow. This rebuttal
could perhaps hold for operational profit sacrificing, where the production
process or distribution channels generate complementarities with the good
deeds that are important for stakeholders, but it is less likely to hold for
explicit profit sacrificing, because CP is easily decoupled from
production. 46
The second strand in win-win approaches to CP—the long-term benefits
version—assumes that limits of governance and managers’ time horizons
cause firms to suffer from short-termism. Those intertemporal problems
affect not only third parties (externalities), but also firms’ value (if, for
example, employees are unwilling to make firm-specific investments in
those firms that are plagued by short-termism). Adopting an approach that
allows for profit sacrificing in the public interest could balance this
detrimental short-termism. It could push insiders toward developing skills
and a willingness to satisfy the implicit demands of stakeholders whose
cooperation is needed (labor, regulators, community), thus maximizing
intertemporal profits.47
The general flaws of the long-term benefits version are reviewed
elsewhere. 48 For purposes of this Article, the limited applicability of the
long-term benefits version to CP is especially relevant. If its basic premise
is to promote firm-specific investments by key stakeholders, then it is hard
to explain sacrificing profits to benefit unrelated third parties who do not
make firm-specific investments (i.e., charitable organizations).49 Consider
a notable attempt in the corporate law literature to apply such an approach:
Margaret Blair’s application of the “team production” model. Blair
46. Compare Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 38, at 10–11, with Fisman et al., supra note
42, at 2. Even within the context of operational profit sacrificing, there are reasons to doubt
the argument: complementarities of good deeds and production do not always exist, and are
not always readily observable to outsiders. See id. at 2.
47. See Fisman et al., supra note 42, at 2. A key assumption in such an argument is that
contracts are incomplete.
48. See, e.g., Porter & Kramer, supra note 29, at 82.
49. A related version sees profit sacrificing as a defensive strategy, meant to reduce the
volatility of future cash flows by limiting the uncertain future claims and decreasing the
likelihood of future regulatory intervention. See Sadok El Ghoul et al., Does Corporate
Social Responsibility Affect the Cost of Capital?, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 2388, 2390 (2011).
The argument of inapplicability to CP that appears in the body of the text applies also to
such a “defensive” version. CP, unlike other CSR activities, is not about being nice to
potential claimants; it is about being nice to unrelated parties, non-claimants. Thus, CP has
to rest on some image considerations: parties you care about observe how nice you behaved
to unrelated parties, and then they update their beliefs and act accordingly.
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describes CP as a specific example of how directors ought to—and do in
fact—use their discretion to steer a clear path between different
stakeholders within the organization.50 What Blair sidesteps is that the
ultimate beneficiaries of directors’ discretion to engage in CP—tax-exempt
organizations—cannot be thought of as part of the “team” that engages in
“production.” 51 The example Blair uses to bypass this problem is telling.
She claims that the infamous case of an oil company, Occidental Petroleum
Co. (Oxy) paying eighty-five million dollars to build a museum in the name
of its soon-to-retire CEO is justified because an especially powerful
member of the team (the CEO) enjoyed this expenditure. 52 This example
illustrates how “stakeholder” explanations to CP collapse into other
explanations (for example, justifying CP as a substitute for explicit CEO
compensation) 53 and fail to specify independently how to make and
measure necessary tradeoffs. 54
2. Corporate Philanthropy as Agency Costs
The win-win approach stresses the adaptive features of CP as benefiting
the company. The agency costs approach, by contrast, suggests that the
seemingly irrational profit-sacrificing phenomenon survives because it
50. See Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 28
STETSON L. REV. 27, 49–50 (1998).
51. Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1220 (1999).
52. See Blair, supra note 50, at 46–47. For further discussion of the Oxy example, see
infra notes 112–07 and accompanying text.
53. See Symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox?, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1282, 1321 (1998). Alternatively, Blair could argue that this donation is
necessary to establish the role of directors as mediating hierarchs, signaling to the other team
members (not just the benefited CEO) the directors’ ability to function well in such a role
and eliciting a cooperative response. But then the team production argument collapses into
an explanation about image concerns as a sort of signaling: we need to make clear why and
how exactly CP generates value through image considerations. See infra Part II.
54. Can the CEO be paid back for his contribution with $200 million of CP? At whose
expense? Why not use these $85 million to benefit other team members, such as employees
in match-giving programs? See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 447–49 (2001); Michael Jensen, Value
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPL. CORP.
FIN. 8 (2001). As applied to the CP context, see James P. Shannon, Foreword to CORPORATE
PHILANTHROPY AT THE CROSSROADS (Dwight F. Burlingame & Dennis R. Young eds., 1996).
Also, if we see donations as benefiting dominant team members (executives), then arguably
donations should be subjected to similar rules that apply to perks and executive
compensation (i.e., much more stringent disclosure and tax rules). Cf. Blair, supra note 50, at
46 n.64. I will return to this point in Parts III and IV.
In my opinion, there are stronger versions of the long-term approach, such as
suggesting that CP enhances the company’s value by buying moral wiggle room with the
public and politicians. See Paul C. Godfrey, The Relationship Between Corporate
Philanthropy and Shareholder Wealth: A Risk Management Perspective, 30 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 777 (2005) (CP generates moral capital among stakeholders and communities; this
moral capital is used as insurance to protect firms’ relational assets); see also Ailian Gan,
The Impact of Public Scrutiny on Corporate Philanthropy, 69 J. BUS. ETHICS 217 (2006)
(companies subject to public scrutiny are more likely to donate).
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makes corporate decision makers better off. The impetus driving CP
behavior is private benefits to those insiders; they donate with shareholders’
money and enjoy disproportionate benefits from the expenditure. Among
the benefits CP can confer to managers are social currency in elite circles,
access to tangible benefits (board seats or tickets to gala events),
satisfaction of their individual other-regarding preferences, and warm
glow. 55
But the managerial utility explanations do not provide well-developed
accounts of the mechanisms that make managers choose CP as a channel to
reap private benefits. To illustrate, it makes no sense for managers to
engage in CP in order to enhance their personal reputations, if the
correlation between levels of engagement in CP and managerial personal
traits is questionable (i.e., if industry and firm characteristics dictate much
of the ability to engage in CP). 56 Alternatively, if the reason managers
engage in CP is to signal their power over their company’s resources, there
are other, arguably more effective means to achieve such a goal, such as
negotiating for better traditional perks (for example, a private jet or a
luxurious corner office). And if the manager engages in CP to get warm
glow and satisfy her own charitable preferences, she could arguably get
more warm glow from negotiating higher pay and then donating the extra
dollars in her own name. A fuller managerial utility explanation should
thus point out unique attributes of pro-social profit sacrificing that make it
effective at generating private benefits.57 Indeed, existing data casts doubt
on mechanisms that were traditionally offered to link CP to managerial
utility. For example, it was found that firms that pay their CEOs more are
not the firms that donate more.58
Another related flaw of managerial utility accounts is that they do not
clearly answer the “so what?” question: assuming CP is indeed driven by
managerial utility, is it necessarily bad for the company, the shareholders,
or overall welfare? In Part III, I will try to narrow these flaws by explaining
how pro-social expenditures are effective at generating private benefits, and
under what conditions pro-sociality is bad for shareholders and society.
While both profit-enhancing and agency costs approaches hold some
sway, each approach suffers from flaws. Deciding which model captures
55. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 17, at 1160–64; Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s
Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV.
579, 609–25 (1997).
56. For example, financial constraints dictate much of CP levels. See Hong et al., supra
note 24; cf. John F. Padgett, Corporate Potlatch, 15 CONTEMP. SOC. 818, 820–21 (1986).
57. For example, one should come up with a story on how gaining discretion over CP
money does not come at the expense of more pay, but rather increases the potential pay
package—perhaps because it stretches the “outrage constraint.” Cf. LUCIAN BEBCHUK &
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 64–70 (2004). Pro-sociality, the argument would
go, is by nature less susceptible to trigger backlash by outsiders than explicit pay/perks.
58. See Navarro, supra note 23; Steven C. Trost, An Examination of Corporate
Charitable Contributions: Evidence from Firm, Managerial, and Community Factors 90–93
(May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia), available at
http://www.stevenctrost.com/diss.pdf (replacement of CEO does not change the firm’s
giving policy).
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reality more accurately is an empirical question, but the evidence is
currently inconclusive. The dearth of firm-specific data and the lack of
means to address causality do not help. The few notable firm-specific
studies generate contrasting results.59 Even findings presumed to favor one
approach can be interpreted to cut both ways, at least until the mechanisms
that link CP to company-level and managerial level benefits are better
articulated.60 This Article next sets forth an attempt at a better explanation
of these mechanisms.
II. CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AS A COSTLY SIGNALING MECHANISM
We saw that profit-enhancing explanations are missing something, but
what exactly is missing? To illustrate, consider a puzzling pattern
identified by an oft-cited study, which tested whether and how pro-sociality
reduces labor costs.61 The hypotheses generated by the traditional buying
goodwill argument are, first, that companies that are more pro-social will do
better at attracting potential job applicants. Second, that the effect will be
mediated by the applicants’ “social” preferences, that is, applicants who feel
strongly about social or environmental issues will be more attracted to prosocial companies. The study’s findings were consistent with the first
hypothesis: in line with the value-enhancing theme, applicants did consider
pro-social companies as more attractive places to work. But the study did
not support the second hypothesis: inconsistent with the buying goodwill
mechanism, the effect was not mediated by the applicants’ social or
environmental preferences. Potential job applicants considered pro-social
companies as more attractive to work for, regardless of whether applicants
cared about social issues.62
This implies that preferences and delegated philanthropy arguments are
not giving us the full account of the benefits arising from pro-sociality. We
should switch focus to image considerations. Apparently, the fact that a
company engages in high levels of pro-sociality was indicative of
something that convinced applicants that the company has other favorable
attributes. Even strictly profit-minded stakeholders prefer companies that
are nice; not because of the niceness per se, but rather because niceness is
an indication of something else. The interesting questions are thus: what is
pro-sociality indicative of, and how exactly can pro-sociality be credibly
indicative of other traits? The following is my attempt to answer these
questions and better understand an unnoticed mechanism that ties pro-

59. For notable early studies, see generally Boatsman & Gupta, supra note 28 (the
association between CP and tax rates suggests giving beyond profit maximization
considerations); Navarro, supra note 23 (firm characteristics drive CP more than managerial
characteristics). For a more recent study, see generally Brown et al., supra note 21 (mixed
results).
60. See Bartkus et al., supra note 21, at 337; Choi & Wang, supra note 17, at 346.
61. See Daniel W. Greening & Daniel B. Turban, Corporate Social Performance as a
Competitive Advantage in Attracting a Quality Workforce, 39 BUS. & SOC’Y 254 (2000).
62. Id.
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sociality to value enhancement—namely, the mitigation of asymmetric
information between outsiders and insiders.
A. The Basic Story: Signaling Financial Strength
It is plausible to assume that there is asymmetric information about
companies’ underlying attributes. Insiders know more than outsiders. Both
have incentives to mitigate the asymmetry. One method for insiders to
mitigate asymmetries is to communicate information to target audiences
about unobservable qualities through observable, costly activities (for
example, handicapping yourself to signal that you can afford it). This is the
basic background of a costly signaling story. As applied here, profit
sacrificing in general and CP in particular can serve as costly and
observable attributes, conveying messages about unobservable attributes.
Out of many possible versions, I will focus on one specific example: CP as
signaling future free cash flows to outside investors.
The signaler in our informal model is the company, or, more precisely, its
insiders (i.e., decision makers, such as top management or dominant
shareholders). Receivers of the signal—the target audience—are outside
investors. Insiders want to convey messages to outsiders about an
underlying but not readily observable attribute, so that outsiders increase
their valuation of the company. One important attribute for valuation is
future free cash flows. Because future free cash flows are not readily
observable by outsiders, they make a plausible subject for costly
signaling. 63 What could constitute an observable costly attribute that
credibly conveys messages about future cash flows? In the current context,
big changes in cash donations could fit the bill. Cash donations are costly
in an intuitive manner: insiders decide to take a dollar that they could have
used to meet the demands of contractual claimants, and instead give it to
unrelated third parties. Outsiders that observe a company substantially
increasing its expenditures on pro-social profit sacrificing will infer that the
company’s insiders perceive their ability to procure future resources as
better than was previously evaluated. Outsiders then update their forecasts
about the company’s prospects accordingly.
But for such a signal to work, it needs to be more than just costly. It has
to be costlier for low-quality companies in order to avoid mimicry (the
costs have to be differentiating and quality-dependent). In the current
context, cash donations need to be costlier for firms with low future free
cash flows than for those with high cash flows.
One could argue that companies with low future cash flows can finance a
high level of donations out of retained earnings or external finance. If
insiders can simply borrow money to raise their CP levels even when times
are bad, then outsiders will not change their valuations based on observing
CP. Yet a recent empirical study showing that corporate goodness is
63. Accounting concepts like depreciation and capital investment bridge a gap between
net profits and uncommitted cash flows. Asymmetric information only increases when the
attribute in question is a perceived future ability.
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costlier for financially constrained firms refutes this argument. 64 There are
several possible reasons behind such a link between corporate goodness and
financial constraints. For one, borrowing to finance the donations is costlier
for companies with relatively bad future prospects because it requires them
to expose themselves to unfavorable covenants or disclosure
requirements. 65 Furthermore, there is evidence that managers care deeply
about meeting earnings benchmarks and smoothing earnings, to the extent
that they will even sacrifice projects with positive net present value to set
aside buffer cash. 66 Thus, it is plausible to assume that insiders in low
quality firms will find it more costly to spend ultra-discretionary dollars on
CP, since they need all the cash buffers they can get. Outsiders observing a
large increase in CP levels could therefore infer that insiders know they are
not going to be financially constrained. 67
Put differently, the conditions for costly signaling are in nuce as
follows. 68 First, companies vary in their ability to generate future free cash
flows. Second, outside investors cannot readily observe future free cash
flows, and stand to gain from knowing more about them. Third, at the same
time, outsiders cannot simply believe all direct messages from insiders
about future free cash flows; insiders stand to gain from sending false,
exaggerated signals. So, outsiders resort to making inferences based on
some observable, costly behaviors of companies, and the fact that the
behavior is costly assures the credibility of the signal; low-quality signalers
cannot incur the same amount of costs as high-quality signalers. Fourth,
one such observable behavior is explicit profit sacrificing. Big cash
donations will carry information about the prospects of the company as long
as the costs of donating are negatively correlated with an ability to generate
future free cash flows.
If these propositions are plausible, then we can assume that
communication through profit sacrificing will be informative. Yet a fully
conscious, meditated decision to sacrifice profits with a clear intent to
signal financial strength is not needed. When the above propositions apply,
we can assume that some “design force”—conscious decision-making,

64. See Hong et al., supra note 24. Another recent study that could be interpreted as
suggestive evidence in favor of signaling establishes that CP is a good predictor (“Grangercause”) of future financial health (revenue growth). See generally Lev et al., supra note 3.
65. For a discussion of external finance as cost-differentiating, see generally Sudipto
Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and “The Bird in the Hand” Fallacy,
10 BELL J. ECON. 259 (1979) (a dividend-signaling model).
66. Cf. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 33 tbl.6 (2005).
67. Alternatively, outsiders can infer that insiders do not care so much about meeting the
earnings per share benchmarks and are not subject to short-term market pressures.
68. My informal model builds on formal models of signaling developed in economics
and sociobiology. See, e.g., Herbert Gintis et al., Costly Signaling and Cooperation, 213 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 103 (2001); Alan Grafen, Biological Signals as Handicaps, 144 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 517 (1990); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON.
355 (1973). See generally AMOTZ ZAHAVI & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE: A
MISSING PIECE OF DARWIN’S PUZZLE (1997) (elaborating on signaling explanations in
sociobiology).
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market forces selection, or imitation of successful companies—will instill
in CP the tenets of a costly, informative signal of financial strength. But are
all these propositions really possible? The next section elaborates on their
potential limitations to arrive at a definition of signaling by conspicuous
goodness.
B. Refining the Basic Story: Limitations
Before concluding that pro-social profit sacrifices bring benefits through
signaling, several conditions and limitations need to be addressed. A
classical criticism against signaling explanations applies in our context as
well: why one particular signal and not another? If throwing cash away
serves as a signal for an ability to procure resources, why should companies
throw it away on charitable organizations? All it takes is for a firm to
sacrifice profits, so why make the sacrifice in the public interest? Why not
signal, for example, with dividend policy? 69 The key to answering this
question is acknowledging that signaling through pro-social sacrifices does
not preclude the use of other signals. In real life, unlike in models, multiple
messages are conveyed by multiple means (both costly and non-costly).70
The real question, then, is not choosing CP over dividends, but what the
mix of signals chosen in the given circumstances will be. While a complete
answer to the mix-of-signals question is beyond the scope of this Article, I
sketch a few guidelines below.
First, some potential signaling channels are often blocked or are too
costly for some firms. For example, most firms do not pay dividends. 71 If
those firms need to signal an ability to procure resources, they have to
resort to other channels, perhaps pro-sociality.
Second, even when different signaling channels are all open, insiders will
not necessarily choose only one channel. For example, signal choice is
affected by the probability that signal receivers will make errors when
evaluating them. When receivers are error-prone, signalers may try to
increase the accuracy by using a “backup,” that is, conveying the same
message through multiple signaling channels rather than exaggerating
signals through the same channel. 72 Indeed, the corporate environment
69. For a discussion of the classical dividend-signaling models, see generally
Bhattacharya, supra note 65; Kose John & Joseph Williams, Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes:
A Signalling Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 1053 (1985); Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend
Policy Under Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031 (1985).
70. In finance, see Harry DeAngelo et al., Reversal of Fortune: Dividend Signaling and
the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 341, 365 (1996). In
sociobiology, see generally Eileen A. Hebets & Daniel R. Papaj, Complex Signal Function:
Developing a Framework of Testable Hypotheses, 57 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY
197 (2005).
71. See Alon Brav et al., Payout Policy in the 21st Century, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 483, 516
(2005).
72. Rufus A. Johnstone, Multiple Displays in Animal Communication: ‘Backup Signals’
and ‘Multiple Messages,’ 351 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS BIOLOGICAL SCI. 329 (1996) [hereinafter
Johnstone, Multiple Displays]. The reason we borrow insights from models developed in the
sociobiology literature is that the information economics literature focuses more on the
strategic aspects of signaling (the why), while sociobiology focuses more on the efficacy of

2012]

CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY

1909

creates a greater need for backup signaling in the face of obstacles such as
noisy communications, strong incentives to cheat, widely varying
perceptions and preferences of receivers, and accelerating signaling costs.73
Accordingly, when insiders want to signal good prospects, they may
supplement the increase in dividends with an increase in CP levels, thus
increasing the chances that outsiders get the right message (for example,
that outsiders are not attributing an increase in dividends to managers
bowing to pressures from shareholders eager for payouts). While this CPas-backup-signal speculation is ultimately a matter for future empirical
research, existing evidence indicates that it is not farfetched. Firms that pay
out more also donate more. 74
Third, aside from factoring in the possibility that multiple signals convey
the same message, we also need to acknowledge that, in reality, each signal
conveys multiple distinct messages. It is true that if insiders want to signal
financial strength, they can do so through various types of sacrifices:
burning money in the street, building luxurious headquarters, or purchasing
lavish perks.
Conspicuous consumption—not just conspicuous
generosity—can signal an ability to procure resources. 75 But each type of
sacrifice also conveys messages apart from information about changes in
resources. For example, the type of sacrifice could say something about
management’s commitment to business strategies. A pro-social handicap
suggests that managers do not hoard cash for themselves and are not subject
to pressure by shareholders to pay out each free dollar. 76 By contrast,
managerial perks do not convey messages about the pro-social tendencies of
corporate decision makers. And dividends do not convey messages about
signaling (the how). Efficacy considerations cannot be ignored when analyzing corporate
communications in a noisy environment filled with strong incentives to cheat. Telephone
Interview with Rufus Johnstone, Dep’t of Zoology, Univ. of Cambridge (Mar. 15, 2011).
73. For discussions on conditions for backup signaling, see generally Hebets & Papaj,
supra note 70 (existence of several different groups of receivers and variability of
preferences within groups of receivers induces backups); Johnstone, Multiple Displays,
supra note 72 (accelerating costs of the main signal); Sarah R. Partan & Peter Marler, Issues
in the Classification of Multimodal Communication Signals, 166 AM. NATURALIST 231
(2005) (non-cooperative, competitive contexts favor the evolution of conspicuous, redundant
signals).
74. See Navarro, supra note 23, at 87–88. Although the positive correlation does not
prove that CP is used as a backup signal to dividends (there are other ways to explain the
positive correlation), it nevertheless indicates a direction worth pursuing and a pattern for
which we must account.
75. Cf. Vladas Griskevicius et al., Blatant Benevolence and Conspicuous Consumption:
When Romantic Motives Elicit Strategic Costly Signals, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
85, 86–87 (2007) (conspicuous generosity—for example, public acts of philanthropy—can
signal both an ability to procure resources and a pro-social personality/tendency. By
contrast, acts of conspicuous consumption can be an alternative signal to the former, but not
to the latter). See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS
(Penguin ed. 1994) (1899) (recognized as the first elaborate treatment of conspicuous
consumption as signaling).
76. In that respect, a better understanding of pro-social behavior could serve as a
window to an area in need of future research: managerial styles and their economic
consequences. See generally Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing with Style:
The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1169, 1170–72 (2003).
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how managers are insulated from the pressure of shareholders with shortterm interests. This does not suggest that pro-social profit sacrificing is a
better signal. After all, too much pro-sociality or too much insulation from
shareholder demands could be interpreted negatively by investors. In
general, because the effectiveness of signals depends on their ability to be
interpreted favorably by receivers, 77 the mix of signals is expected to vary
across companies and times. For example, the mix will depend on how
outsiders evaluate the company’s investment opportunities. The point is
that the existence of other potential ways to signal does not categorically
eliminate the potential for signaling benefits from conspicuous goodness.
Another major criticism of the costly signaling theory is that CP is not
really costly. To be sure, CP does cost something, but is it truly a handicap
to big firms? After all, CP levels in many companies represent only a
“modest incremental cash drain on resources available to managers,”78 and
modest costs cannot differentiate between high- and low-quality signalers.
The key to accommodating this limitation is to refine our predictions
regarding benefits arising from signaling. Pro-sociality will convey
credible messages about future financial prospects only when conducted on
a large scale relative to a company’s size and resources. Day-to-day
marginal contributions are not likely to generate signaling benefits; big
changes in CP policy are. 79 For example, in March 2008, when Goldman
Sachs announced a new $100 million CP program meant to further business
education of women in the developing world, outsiders took notice.80
Outsiders were free to infer that Goldman’s top managers simply cared
about the cause of women’s business education, or that they were hoping to
buy goodwill by appearing nice. But outsiders may also have inferred that
Goldman’s managers thought that the company could afford to sacrifice
profits much more than it had previously because future prospects were
looking brighter. An event study checking the impact of announcements of
big donations (or, conversely, announcements of omissions from social
rankings or surveys) is another matter for future empirical research.81
77. An effective signal is less prone to a “mixed-motivations” problem: outsiders
perceive the expenditure not as an arbitrary cost (that is, a handicap signaling something),
but rather as a cost incurred in order to generate intrinsic benefits to the signaler. When
behavior is perceived to be intrinsically beneficial to the actor, it cannot be an effective
costly signal. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 11–35 (2000).
78. See DeAngelo et al., supra note 70, at 343–44; id. at 368 (noting that corporate
signals must be considerable handicaps).
79. The emphasis is not only on “big” but also on “changes.” CP policy of pursuing
rigidly a rule of thumb like donating 1 percent of profits year after year will tell us less than
unexpected changes.
80. See 10,000 Women Brochure, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/
citizenship/10000women/10000-women-immersive/10000-women-brochure.pdf (last visited
Mar. 23, 2012).
81. Of course, a positive stock price impact could be interpreted in many ways. The key
in such a future study would thus be to identify the contrasting predictions. To simplify: a
signaling-benefits hypothesis would predict a bigger impact in companies and industries that
are more equity-dependent and where future prospects are more uncertain, while under the
buying goodwill hypothesis, the benefits of being nice are unrelated to financial strength or
to asymmetric information.

2012]

CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY

1911

What is more, the perceived costs of explicit profit sacrifices are arguably
greater relative to their absolute costs and to expenditures such as
operational profit sacrifices. Managers of companies that fail to meet
expectations will arguably be pressed to explain why they were so
conspicuously generous with the company’s dwindling resources, rather
than to explain equivalent expenditures on greener modes of production or
employees’ conditions. In other words, ultra-discretionary expenditures on
unrelated third parties, especially when the resources could have been easily
deployed within the company, are likely to be perceived as meaningful
handicaps even when their absolute size is small relative to other
expenditures.
A related potential criticism would suggest that CP is not a reliable signal
precisely because it is too discretionary. If insiders suffer no punishment
when reducing the level of CP, then the value of the signal is eroded. To
accommodate this limitation, we first need to understand that the stickiness
of signals is not a binary matter. Indeed, signals need to have some level of
stickiness 82 to be reliable because something removable at will is not a true
handicap. But once this minimal threshold of stickiness is reached, the
optimal level of stickiness varies according to many considerations. Do
pro-social expenditures meet this stickiness threshold? While CP might be
less sticky than other pro-social expenditures (such as reversing
expenditures on employees’ working conditions), anecdotal evidence
indicates that there is a degree of asymmetric stickiness to CP. Managers
enjoy much flexibility when deciding to initiate or raise CP levels, but there
are perceived costs to omitting or dropping existing levels. For example,
managers fear reputational sanctions and personal pressures from NGOs if
the company drops its support. Social ratings by information intermediaries
provide another commitment mechanism, because the stock market
apparently punishes companies when their social ratings decrease.83
A fourth potential limitation of the signaling theory is that pro-sociality is
not observable to outsiders in a timely and useful manner. Although this
limitation applies more strongly to operational profit sacrificing than to
CP—cash donations in particular are readily communicated and
quantified—this is still a strong limitation. As mentioned, disclosure of CP
is unregulated, and this creates an environment in which it is difficult for
companies to reliably convey the relative level of their explicit prosociality. 84 Though lack of regulation is likely to reduce the benefits from
signaling, it will not totally eliminate them. We should think of it as
82. “Stickiness” here denotes the tendency of decision makers to leave the level of an
expenditure unchanged. The various considerations dictating the optimal level of stickiness
from a signaling-efficacy point of view include, among other things, what message is
conveyed (is it a transitory fixed change in underlying attributes?), and what other means are
available to convey this message (increasing the dividend level?).
83. See Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 38, at 12 n.18; Interview with Bill Valentino, Vice
President for CSR in China, Bayer, in Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 6, 2010). To be sure, such
an argument about the level of stickiness is speculative, and future event studies are still
needed to establish it.
84. See infra Part IV.
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creating conditions for some coarse signaling story: companies wishing to
distinguish themselves can voluntarily disclose their conspicuous goodness
in a wide and timely manner, but outsiders will be able to distinguish
between companies based on their CP levels only when the differences
across companies and time are great. Again, the conclusion is that the
profit sacrifices most likely to generate signaling benefits are big changes,
which are easily communicated to outsiders.
Having accommodated all those considerations, 85 we are now left with a
limited, refined story of corporate pro-sociality as a signal to outside
investors. Only sacrifices that are relatively significant in size, readily
observable, and not easily reversed can be expected to serve as an effective
signal. 86 Granted, these limitations confine the applicability of the
signaling story to only a small number of actual CP decisions. Yet it is
precisely those few large donations that are practically important; a small
number of donations comprise the bulk of overall corporate giving
expenditures and raise the most concerns. 87 The signaling-to-investors
story is therefore relevant to the more significant and/or controversial cases
of CP, and thus merits attention.
Furthermore, even when circumstances make the signaling-to-investors
story unlikely, it is important to consider the asymmetric information
perspective on pro-social expenditures. It could be that pro-sociality
conveys other messages to other audiences. For example, product or
employee release-time donations 88 might be ineffective signals to investors
looking for information on future financial conditions, but they could serve
as effective signals to employees looking for information on management’s
commitment to a certain corporate culture. It is these other sorts of
signaling stories—signaling to non-financial stakeholders—to which this
Article now turns.

85. There is another, generic objection that was not addressed here. Corporate signaling
models rely on twin assumptions: not only asymmetric information, but also short-termism.
That is, managers are assumed to care about current stock prices and not just about finite
value. If they cared only about finite value, then they would have no reason to incur the
costs of signaling to convey information that will be eventually reflected in stock prices
anyhow. Against these twin assumptions, the argument goes, why can shareholders not
contract with managers to reduce incentives to engage in costly signaling? See generally
Philip H. Dybvig & Jaime F. Zender, Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with
Asymmetric Information, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 201, 204–15 (1991). The answers to this generic
objection are well developed in the finance literature, and I defer to them. See, e.g., Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or
Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719, 722 n.6 (1993).
86. Additionally, alternative non-pro-social signals should be somewhat costaccelerating or noisy.
87. See REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE OF THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON H.R. 887 REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 32 (May 2009), reprinted in Increasing Disclosure to Benefit
Investors: Hearing on H.R. 887 and H.R. 1089 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous
Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 90 (1999) [hereinafter Increasing
Disclosure to Benefit Investors].
88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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C. Other Possible Stories: Signaling Product Quality
or Workplace Attractiveness
In order to flesh out the plausibility of benefits arising from signaling in
corporate pro-sociality, I used a specific example of conveying messages to
investors about financial strength. 89 To my knowledge, this is the first
attempt to describe value-enhancing aspects of CP in this way. But prosociality in general, and CP in particular, can also have other informational
contents and target audiences. This section addresses those different
signaling stories. First, I discuss the few previous accounts of signaling that
are found in the management and finance literature, in which CP is studied
as conveying messages to customers or employees. Then, I sketch another
possibility of signaling to investors, which conveys the riskiness of future
cash flows.
According to a signaling-to-customers story, high levels of CP convey
information about the quality of the firm’s product.90 The model assumes
two types of entrepreneurs. One type has other-regarding preferences, and
thus cares about externalities, and the other type lacks those preferences and
cares only about profits. For the other-regarding types, sacrificing profits is
less costly, as they gain warm glow by refraining from externalities. By
contrast, for the purely profit-motivated entrepreneurs, CP is a total
sacrifice. Accordingly, the model assumes that when customers observe a
company engaging in higher CP levels than its competitors, they infer that
insiders in this company will be more averse to sacrifice unobservable
qualities of products than their competitors are (because sacrificing product
quality will generate externalities, which will in turn decrease the otherregarding entrepreneur’s utility). This theory addresses some of the flaws
in the delegated philanthropy accounts. It argues that CP is valueenhancing not because it satisfies customers’ preferences for nice
companies, but rather because it mitigates informational gaps about
attributes relevant to the company’s line of business.
While this general direction of inquiry is worthy, in my opinion, the
specifics of this signaling-to-customers theory rests on some shaky
assumptions. First, just like delegated philanthropy explanations, the
signaling-to-customers theory assumes that charitable preferences drive
corporate behavior—only here, the preferences are those of entrepreneurs
rather than consumers. Such an assumption might be plausible in managerowned, small companies where the entrepreneur is tantamount to the
company, but it is less plausible for large impersonal corporations.91
Second, the theory assumes that information on CP levels can be easily
observed and compared by customers who make purchases accordingly, but

89. See supra Part II.A.
90. See Fisman et al., supra note 42 (setting out a model); see also Donald S. Siegel &
Donald F. Vitaliano, An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 773 (2007) (empirical testing of the model).
91. Moreover, firms could simply select managers with charitable preferences, thus
gaining a competitive advantage.
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recent empirical studies suggest that consumers’ awareness of CP policies
is actually low. 92
Another possibility for pro-sociality to generate signaling benefits is
through attracting high-quality employees. Proponents of the profitenhancing approach frequently argue that one of CP’s benefits is decreased
costs of labor, but they do not adequately articulate the mechanisms that
supposedly cause this.
A “delegated philanthropy” mechanism—
suggesting that employees’ morale gets a boost from working for nice
companies—is problematic for the reasons mentioned above, and a “betterimage” mechanism—suggesting that a company’s “niceness” gives it a
better image as a workplace—is merely a starting point for analysis.
Instead, the question is: how exactly is CP associated with working
conditions?
This relates to the puzzling empirical pattern discussed above: job
applicants preferred pro-social companies regardless of how they felt about
pro-sociality itself. 93 So what did the level of pro-sociality teach applicants
about the company? For one, pro-sociality could have sent a message about
a “cooperative” corporate culture. High pro-sociality suggests that the top
management is committed to being not only profit-hungry, but also otherregarding. Donating managers will thus be seen as more likely to continue
to engage in “gift-exchange” relationships with employees in the future.
More generally, explicit profit sacrificing can serve as a credible and visible
commitment to a certain corporate culture, thus helping to generate efficient
assortative matching (that is, attracting job applicants who will fit the
company). 94 One implication of these hypotheses is that benefits arising
from signaling to employees will be more relevant in high-quality labor
industries, and so in those industries we should expect more CP, all else
being equal. Perhaps it is yet another factor explaining the dominance of
pharmaceutical and technology companies among the largest corporate
donors.
To return to investor signaling, big increases in CP can convey
fundamental information not only about the level of future free cash flows,
but also about systematic decreases in riskiness of future cash flows, thus
updating the denominator rather than the numerator in the discounted cash
flow formula. When projections of cash flows become less risky, insiders
can make better assessments of their future opportunities and opportunity
92. See, e.g., Sen et al., supra note 45, at 164.
93. See generally Greening & Turban, supra note 61.
94. The emphases are on credibility and visibility. Existing signaling-to-employees
stories do not account adequately for issues such as mimicry; if management can reduce
labor costs at will simply by denoting certain organizational values, why do we not observe
every company doing so? Regarding visibility, for a corporate culture to attract outsiders, it
needs to be visible to those not experiencing it; hence, there must be some observable
symbols associated with certain cultures. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial
Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1982) (discussing the gift-exchange aspect of corporate
culture); Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations,
in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, 255 (Peter Diamond & Hannu
Vartiainen eds., 2007) (noting that corporate culture plays a role in assortative matching).
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costs, and can thus better maximize the level of pro-social sacrifices—they
need less cash buffers. In this respect, pro-sociality could mitigate
asymmetric information about changes along the life cycles of
organizations and managerial reactions to those changes. 95
D. Adding Complexity
After sketching the contours of a basic signaling explanation to corporate
pro-sociality, I can introduce additional layers of complexity, such as the
choice between pro-social and wasteful signals, the possibility for errors in
signaling, and costs from attracting the wrong reaction.
A necessary condition for costly signaling is that the behavior will be
costly to the signaler. But nothing in the model requires the behavior to
actually benefit others. The handicap can be pro-social, but it can just as
well be wasteful (as in conspicuous consumption). A fuller analysis should
thus account for conditions under which pro-social signals are more
effective than wasteful ones. For example, if receivers have preferences for
pro-social displays and if such displays receive greater attention (known as
“broadcast efficiency”), then the signaler should prefer them to wasteful
handicaps. 96 The choice of signals also has policy implications. Society
might be better off when corporate signaling is done via pro-social
handicaps, rather than wasteful ones—think donations versus goldembroidered shower curtains. 97
It is also important to take fuller account of errors in signaling
communication. We have already mentioned that receivers are error-prone
when perceiving signals in noisy environments. Signalers can be errorprone, too. For example, corporate managers might be overly optimistic.
When deciding CP levels based on their upwardly biased perception of
future prospects, managers might “advertise” too much, that is, engage in
too much CP. 98 A bias in forecasting future cash flows erodes the value of
the signal and at some point the signaling stops being informative.
Therefore, the corporate context, with its noisy environments and over-

95. Cf. Gustavo Grullon et al., Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity?, 75 J.
BUS. 387 (2002) (payout policy as signaling risk); Marc Orlitzky & John D. Benjamin,
Corporate Social Performance and Firm Risk: A Meta-analytic Review, 40 BUS. & SOC’Y
369, 376 (2001); Van Der Laan et al., supra note 33, at 308 (noting that we need to explore
the effects of organizational life cycles on CP).
96. See Gintis et al., supra note 68, at 112–15. As applied here, the choice between
different signals is perhaps where the “delegated philanthropy” consideration kicks in, as
(only) a second-order influence. Companies sacrifice profits to signal their ability to procure
resources, and they do so by being nice, rather than being wasteful, because their audiences
prefer interacting with nicer companies.
97. Cf. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 425 NATURE 785,
789 (2003); Geoffrey F. Miller, The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin’s
Puzzle, 19 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 343, 347 (1998) (reviewing ZAHAVI & ZAHAVI, supra
note 68).
98. On managerial over-optimism in general, see J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and
Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33, 39–40 (2002). For an analogy from the dividendsignaling literature, see generally DeAngelo et al., supra note 70.
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optimistic signalers, necessitates a thorough understanding of the extent of
errors in signaling.
Finally, future research could also consider the possibility of another type
of cost to the signaler—namely, attracting an unintended observer or
provoking an unintended reaction from target audiences. Explicit profit
sacrificing is conspicuous, and conspicuousness can attract predators who
think that the signaler has too much waste.99 Consider activist hedge funds.
When such predators observe a company increasing its profit sacrificing,
they may decide to target the company because of the slack it obviously
possesses. Regardless of whether activist hedge funds are beneficial to
overall welfare, incumbent managers usually want to avoid attracting them.
Indeed, insiders worried about attracting hedge funds could be pushed to
choose suboptimal signaling levels ex ante. Future empirical research could
try to shed light on this speculation by examining, for example, whether
changes in CP policies attract certain investors.
E. Fit with Evidence
The story thus far has been hypotheses-generating rather than
hypotheses-testing. Future empirical research could further refine and/or
discredit the logic suggested here. In particular, as signaling is being
judged based on eliciting behavioral responses from receivers, we should
study stock market reactions to unexpected announcements of big changes
in CP policy. Until such systematic data are available, though, we could
look at the congruence between our theory and patterns already identified,
to assess the plausibility of benefits arising from signaling. The signalingcash-flows version, for example, predicts a higher level of CP in companies
and industries where future free cash flows are less readily observable by
outsiders, free cash is perceived to be good for the company, 100 and other
channels for signaling cash flows are blocked or too costly. Do these
predictions fit with the patterns observed?
As firm-specific data are scarce, we resort to indications at the industry
level. The fact that pharmaceuticals and technology companies are among
the largest donors is consistent with these predictions. 101 Those companies
rely relatively heavily on external finance, which is costly for various
reasons. Their future cash flows depend on technological and medical
innovations not easily observable by outsiders, their tangible assets
contribute little to firm value, and their earnings are more opaque. Other
factors necessitate maintaining a relatively large cash buffer: long gestation
periods of products (for example, pushing a new drug through the FDA
99. See generally Hebets & Papaj, supra note 70.
100. Excess cash could be evaluated positively or negatively by investors. It depends on
firm- and industry-related factors, like the relative importance of mitigating risk, preserving
financial flexibility, or avoiding underinvestment. It also depends on how investors expect
this cash to be used by insiders. Free cash is prone to be turned into private benefits. See
Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Paradox of Liquidity, 113 Q.J. ECON. 733
(1998).
101. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
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approval stages) and volatility of earnings generate a great need for finance
before the company’s own cash flows become more verifiable.102
Uncommitted, internal sources of finance like free cash could thus be
especially valuable.
These observations are indicative at best. 103 What else have we to show
for the signaling story predictions? One especially notable empirical
pattern arising from meta-analyses is that CP—the most discretionary,
explicit form of profit sacrificing—has a stronger association with financial
performance than other corporate social performance expenditures. It is
difficult to reconcile this pattern with existing theories. For example, under
the delegated philanthropy story, corporations are better positioned to cater
to charitable preferences only when good deeds are intertwined with
production, and so operational profit sacrificing should be associated with
profits more strongly than CP. 104 Similarly, under the managerial utility
explanation, the most discretionary expenditure is supposed to be the most
susceptible to managerial abuse, and so CP is expected to be less strongly
associated with good financial performance. 105
The signaling story, by contrast, fits this empirical pattern. A signal has
to be clearly communicated, quantifiable, and perceived to be handicapping
with few intrinsic benefits. Cash donations are more effective signals than
operational profit-sacrifices; they are more easily communicated and
quantifiable to outsiders. Moreover, the fact that they benefit unrelated
third parties (i.e., are more explicit sacrifices) means that they are perceived
as greater handicaps than operational sacrifices.
Another puzzling empirical pattern is the dominance of cash over in-kind
donations. Traditional profit-enhancing theories predict that in-kind
donations would yield better results than cash donations in terms of tax
advantages, better bundling of warm glow with intrinsic utility, and
stronger consumer preferences. 106 Yet the opposite is observed: cash
donations generate better reputational payoffs. 107 Why? This Article
proposes that some of the value enhancement comes from signaling: cash
donations are more effective signals because they are easily observable and
less open to interpretation. 108
102. Indeed, Brown et al., supra note 21, at 867, mention volatility of earnings as one of
the predictors of industry variance in CP. On the relatively greater dependency on external
capital in those industries, compare Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial
Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559, 566 tbl.1 (1998).
103. The facts can also be explained through non-signaling stories. For example, tax laws
favor product donations by the technology and pharmaceutical industries. See Sugin, supra
note 44, at 157.
104. See supra Part I.A.2.
105. Cf. Myers & Rajan, supra note 100 (noting that free cash is more susceptible to
managerial abuse).
106. See Sugin, supra note 44, at 156–57 (noting tax advantages); supra note 44 and
accompanying text (noting consumer preferences).
107. See, e.g., Stephen Brammer & Andrew Millington, Corporate Reputation and
Philanthropy: An Empirical Analysis, 61 J. BUS. ETHICS 29 (2005) (a UK study).
108. One could claim that managers choose cash over product donations because it allows
them to reap private benefits more effectively, compare Bartkus et al., supra note 21, at 329,
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Importantly, these patterns do not provide conclusive evidence in favor
of the signaling story. Causation between CP and corporate financial
performance is more complex, and alternative explanations also fit these
empirical patterns. Yet those patterns are indications that existing theories
do not fully capture the drivers and consequences of CP, and that pursuing
the signaling angle could lead to a more comprehensive account.109
Furthermore, I do not suggest that by simply raising their pro-sociality,
firms can compel outsiders to immediately upgrade their evaluations of the
firm. As with dividends and other corporate signaling mechanisms, prosociality is probably only a “‘punctuation mark’ at the end of the
sentence” 110: if companies are doing well financially and communicating
well by other means (for example, managerial forecasts), then an increase in
pro-sociality can add an extra punch to the message delivered. My
argument is thus modest: among other benefits stemming from prosociality, big changes in donations might also increase the probability that
outsiders will perceive a firm’s fundamentals to be better than they
previously thought.
III. CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AS A CO-OPTATION MECHANISM
The previous part sought a better understanding of the positive side of
CP: how CP is good for the company. This part seeks a better
understanding of the negative side: how CP can also be bad for the
company. It is generally accepted that pro-social profit sacrificing is driven
to some extent by managerial utility considerations. The debate is over the
extent to which those considerations drive it and the implications. Yet, both
sides of the debate often downplay an important distinction that this part
emphasizes: the distinction between profit-sacrificing expenditures that
merely reflect agency costs, and those that actually generate more agency
costs.
The basic logic here is intuitive. If managers enjoy wide discretion to
sacrifice profits and can use this discretion to further their own interests,
then they can also use it to entrench themselves and weaken the
mechanisms that monitor them, generating more agency costs.111 The
but such an argument does not explain why cash donations yield better reputational payoffs
for the company.
109. A general clarification: the signaling explanation is not meant to be exhaustive. CP
behavior cannot be explained under a single theory. These are context-sensitive decisions,
influenced also by individuals’ values. CP policies can simultaneously contain agency
problems, buying goodwill, and costly signaling aspects. Theories of CP should thus be
conditional, not general. Moreover, given the dynamic character of corporate signaling, any
signaling explanation might become anachronistic, fit only to describe the historical
evolution. For example, the recent trend of managers voluntarily issuing cash flow forecasts
could reduce the need to use costly signals to convey cash flow information. See generally
Charles E. Wasley & Joanna Shuang Wu, Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow
Forecasts?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 389 (2006). We thus need to consistently reevaluate the fit of
evidence with the signaling theory predictions.
110. Cf. Brav et al., supra note 71, at 512.
111. An implicit assumption here is that markets are somewhat limited in constraining
managers.
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question, then, is not whether managers can abuse CP in such ways, but
rather whether managers want to do so. Is profit sacrificing really an
effective means to the supposed end of weakening corporate governance?
Logic, anecdotal observations, and recent empirical studies suggest several
reasons to answer this question in the affirmative. CP money can be used
by managers as mechanisms to co-opt independent directors, influence
politicians, and entrench themselves by allying with activist stakeholders.
Before I begin to explore those mechanisms in detail, let me illustrate the
distinction between problem-reflecting and problem-generating CP with
two infamous cases, Occidental Petroleum Co. (Oxy) and Enron. Oxy
donated more than $85 million (a third of its annual profits) to a museum
named after Armand Hammer, its soon-to-retire CEO. Enron was much
more modest; the company donated between $1 and $2 million to a medical
center headed by a member of the board audit committee, and several
hundred thousand to a think tank that employed another independent
director. 112 Usually, agency explanations of CP lump both instances
together. In both cases, decision makers used discretion over corporate
profit-sacrificing money to satisfy the preferences of top management.
Seen from this angle, the Oxy case is much more detrimental to company
and shareholder interests simply because the sacrifice is larger.
But is it really more problematic? In Oxy’s case, the donation was
disclosed, as the amount was material enough to mandate disclosure under
the securities laws. 113 No adverse impact on stock prices was observed
when the sacrifice was announced, 114 perhaps because the market already
anticipated that Armand Hammer controlled the board and could pass
decisions on whatever other types of profit sacrificing that he pleased.
Arguably, no agency costs were created because of this donation; it only
reflected existing agency costs.
By contrast, Enron consistently pursued a CP policy that undermined the
checks and balances on corporate governance. Perhaps not surprisingly, its
donations were not disclosed. The direct hit to the financial bottom line
from those donations was insignificant, but what mattered more than the
levels of the donations were the targets of the donations. The choice of
targets made it somewhat less likely that the CEO would be asked tough
questions later. In my view, these latter types of donations represent a
corporate governance problem justifying legal intervention even more than
the former type of pure self-aggrandizement.
To understand why this distinction is not trivial, it is important to
understand the generic “fixed appropriation” objection to critical agency
112. See generally Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (containing an analysis of
the Oxy CP decision); Stuart L. Gillan & John D. Martin, Financial Engineering, Corporate
Governance, and the Collapse of Enron 49 tbl.6 (Univ. of Del. Coll. of Bus. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2002-001, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=354040 (listing examples of Enron’s CP policy).
113. Disclosure of the donation likely would have occurred in any event, as building a
museum in your name is not something you could or would want to hide.
114. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of
Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 990 n.161 (1999).
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costs accounts of CP. One could argue that managerial discretion to engage
in CP, even when translated into value diversion (for example, pet
charities), does not really hurt shareholders. The key assumption in such an
argument is that managerial discretion is capped by market and/or
contractual mechanisms, such that increased use of discretion to sacrifice
profits pro-socially will come at the expense of other managerial
expenditures, such as executive pay and perks. Any benefits that managers
achieve through CP will offset other forms of managerial appropriation. 115
The fixed appropriation argument is assailable: compensating managers
with discretion over CP is ineffective; value diversion is not really neutral
because it generates perverse effects on managerial efforts (incentives); and
allowing additional channels for value diversion increases managerial
agency costs, because more channels for appropriation increase the
difficulty of tracking and capping managerial abuse.116
This Article emphasizes a different rebuttal: managerial discretion in an
unregulated channel like CP can be used to co-opt those in charge of
monitoring. Like the previous rebuttals, my argument challenges the
assumption that agency costs are capped regardless of the value diversion
method. Unlike the previous rebuttals, my argument stresses that monitors
will find it more difficult subjectively (not only objectively) to cap
managerial agency costs when also having to track the unregulated CP
channel, because monitors will be reluctant to constrain managers when the
latter donate to the monitors’ preferred charities.
There are three channels through which CP can generate agency costs.
First, there is a possibility that CP money will be used to co-opt board
independence. This possibility was mentioned in the legal literature when
alluding to Enron’s paradigmatic case, 117 but this pattern is not limited to
Enron. Look to other post-mortem analyses of failed governance
mechanisms and you are likely to find that one of the tactics top
management used to co-opt the board is donations to independent directors’
pet charities. Ross Johnson did it at RJR Nabisco, 118 Conrad Black at
Hollinger, 119 and Dennis Kozlowski at Tyco, 120 to name but a few. To be
115. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 3, at 835–39.
116. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and
Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 487 (1999); David I. Walker, The Manager’s
Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587 (2005); Symposium, supra note 53, at 1321. It was
also pointed out that the view of CP as merely another form of executive compensation does
not fit with current laws. CP is not subject to the same tax and disclosure laws as executive
compensation. See id. at 1327 (discussing disclosure obligations). I can add anecdotally that
such a concept is also inconsistent with practice; a leading executive compensation attorney
noted that his clients do not consider the level of discretion over pro-social expenditures
when negotiating their pay. Interview with Joseph Bachelder, Founder and Senior Partner,
Bachelder Law Firm, in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 2008).
117. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, On Sacrificing Profits in the Public Interest, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 88, 96–97 (Bruce
L. Hay et al. eds., 2005).
118. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 82, 97 (1990).
119. See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF HOLLINGER INTERNATIONAL INC. 409–25 (Aug. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/868512/000095012304010413/y01437exv99w2.
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sure, abuse of CP was not the main cause of corporate governance failures
in those companies. But even a minor contribution to such colossal
governance failures may be important enough to justify consideration by
policy makers.
Critics could suggest that these are only anecdotes, and that there is no
systematic evidence showing that such misuses of CP are meaningful
enough to merit attention. Still, we cannot expect to find systematic
evidence of abuses when no mandatory disclosure is required. Insiders will
not voluntarily disclose such details, and so the dirty laundry will be aired
in public only when post-mortem investigations generate access to the
company’s books. 121 As board independence increasingly becomes a
governance panacea, the attractiveness of CP as an implicit channel to
influence directors without losing their “independent” tag will probably
only increase. 122
A second mechanism that makes CP a corporate governance issue is the
use of money designated as CP to influence politics. The ability and
willingness of corporations to use CP in politics is especially relevant
today. In the aftermath of the Citizens United v. FEC 123 decision, there has
been a lively discussion in Congress, the SEC, and legal academia on the
need to introduce protective mechanisms for explicit political spending.
Not enough attention, however, has been directed to the possibility of
bypassing protective mechanisms through corporate donations to taxexempt “charitable” organizations that serve as conduits for political
influence; that is, implicit political spending. CP is relatively unregulated,
so managers have incentives to couch political spending as CP in order to
evade restrictions on explicit political donations. The means exist to
effectuate this managerial will. While I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) non-profit
organizations may not legally engage in political activity, there is ample
room to characterize political activity as “educational,” thus maintaining an
organization’s tax-exempt status. Two notable ways to engage in
politicized CP are: first, funding think-tanks that qualify as educational
organizations while de facto supporting very specific policies or politicians;
and second, supporting classic advocacy organizations (also known as
§ 501(c)(4) organizations) with CP money, through the “c3/c4 split” (i.e.,
lobbying organizations establishing a complementary tax-exempt entity that
is heavily funded by corporations). 124
htm. The report accuses Black of two categories of misuse of CP: as self-aggrandizement,
for example, by attributing company donations to himself, thus usurping public credit, see id.
at 415 tbl.14; and as a co-optation device, for example, by donating to independent directors’
pet charities, see id. at 419 tbl.15.
120. Michael J. Bohnen & David M. Phillips, Corporate Gifts Should Be Disclosed,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 21, 2002, at 39.
121. Compare Blair, supra note 50, at 45–47 (reports of managerial abuse are isolated
anecdotes), with Barnard, supra note 17, at 1163–64 (reports are “illustrative of [a] dark
side”).
122. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 57, at 29.
123. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
124. For a detailed analysis of the distinction between explicit and implicit political
influence, see Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt
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Such uses of CP money are obviously an issue for campaign finance
laws, but they might also be a corporate governance problem. To be sure,
political donations are not necessarily bad for shareholders. If insiders use
their clout over politicians to further favorable policies, then shareholders
may actually value the purchase of political clout with CP money.125 The
point here is that political donations can also be used to further narrow,
managerial interests, such as lowering investor protection.126
Consider the case of managerial lobbying for corporate laws that are not
necessarily in shareholders’ interests: anti-takeover legislation. The legal
literature took note of the influence managers had in pushing for those laws,
but it ignored how managers influenced politics, particularly the role CP
played as part of the “influence technology” of managers. For example,
when Dayton Hudson, a Minnesota corporation, became a target for
takeover in 1987, the managers convinced the state to hold a special
legislative session where the company’s charitable record was used as
consideration for enacting a new anti-takeover bill.127 More generally,
funding certain think tanks and indirectly funding lobbying organizations
translate into promoting management-friendly laws, such as hurdles on
shareholder litigation and lobbying against increased transparency
requirements and shareholder involvement. Indeed, a recent empirical
study found that explicit political spending affects shareholder value
negatively.128 Perhaps implicit political spending, via CP that is done
without public scrutiny, is at least as detrimental to shareholders.
A third, less intuitive use of CP to generate further agency costs is as a
subtle anti-takeover mechanism. This argument was recently made
Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 908–11, 922
n.197, 928 (1997). For detailed examples of politicized CP, see Kahn, supra note 55, at
636–62. For a theoretical account, see generally STEVEN R. NEIHEISEL, CORPORATE
STRATEGY AND THE POLITICS OF GOODWILL (1994). For examples of lobbying organizations
that are heavily funded by corporate donations, see Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 93–
95.
125. Indeed, one could cite evidence that firms in regulated industries give more to
support claims that politicized CP is profit-driven. See Brown et al., supra note 21, at 872.
From the point of view of diversified shareholders, however, corporate rent-seeking is not
necessarily good; it might simply redistribute wealth from one company to another with
deadweight losses. Cf. Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion,
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2002).
126. There is no evidence suggesting that such misuses take place on a meaningful level,
as is perhaps expected given the lack of a disclosure requirement, but anecdotal evidence
suggests that this is a real possibility worthy of further research.
127. On managerial-driven anti-takeover legislation, including the Dayton Hudson
example, see MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS ch. 10 (1994). For an
elaborate discussion on the role that Dayton Hudson’s CP policy played in influencing the
legislation, see HARVARD BUS. SCH. CASE STUDY NO. 9-391-403, DAYTON HUDSON
CORPORATION: CONSCIENCE AND CONTROL (A, B, C) (1990). See other examples at Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and Power in
Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1140 n.126 (1997) [hereinafter
Kahn, Reflections]; Kahn, supra note 55, at 633–34.
128. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What
Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? (Harvard Law and Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 684, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680861.
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regarding corporate social responsibility in general. Managers invest
strategically in profit sacrificing in order to gain support from activists,
such as consumer groups or public pension funds. Those activists are then
expected to return the favor by reducing the probability of CEO turnover.
Even if a potential raider can increase a company’s value, activist
stakeholders will have incentives to keep incumbent managers in place, as
long as incumbents credibly commit to continue investing in specific social
or environmental issues. Activists can use non-conventional “voice”
mechanisms—mounting a media campaign, threatening boycotts, or using
their political clout—to support incumbents and fend off takeovers. Initial
empirical evidence lends support to the pro-sociality as entrenchment
hypothesis. 129
For purposes of this Article, the question is whether sacrificing profits to
gain personal favor with activists applies not only to operational profit
sacrificing but also to CP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it does. In the
Minnesota anti-takeover bill, for example, Dayton Hudson’s CP policy was
not merely touted as valuable; the incumbents also called upon the
company’s grantees—apparently key players in the state—to help promote
managerial lobbying efforts. 130 More generally, the question is: can
incumbents commit to a specific CP policy that is favored by activists better
than insurgents can? 131 If the answer is yes, then CP can reduce CEO
turnover to a suboptimal level, and the case for legal intervention in CP is
thereby strengthened. 132 Possible mechanisms to credibly commit to
specific CP policies include sitting on boards of specific NGOs, or getting
highly involved in the social circles of NGO leaders.133
Viewed as a co-optation mechanism and not merely a managerial perk,
CP can explain why firms with independent boards donate more. 134 If
profit sacrificing is a managerial perk, then arguably managers who are
monitored by independent boards should engage in it less. But if CP is not
only self-aggrandizing but also entrenching, then managerial-driven CP
should only increase when internal governance is stronger (for example,
when boards are more independent). Under a greater internal threat to their

129. See generally Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, Corporate Social Responsibility
and Managerial Entrenchment, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 741 (2007) (setting a
model); Surroca & Tribó, supra note 22 (empirical testing of the model). But cf. Annita
Florou, Discussion of Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance, 35 J.
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 790, 791–92 (2008) (noting that limitations and directions future research
will need to explore in order to increase the applicability of said empirical tests).
130. See JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, LOOKING GOOD AND DOING GOOD: CORPORATE
PHILANTHROPY AND CORPORATE POWER 129 (1997).
131. While it might be intuitive to think that incumbents can make manager-specific
investments in operational pro-sociality that make them valuable for stakeholders (for
example, specializing in a particular green mode of production), it is less clear how
managers can commit to being “better” at CP than those who want to replace them.
132. See infra Part IV.
133. As was indeed the case in the Twin Cities. Cf. Joseph Galaskiewicz, An Urban
Grants Economy Revisited: Corporate Charitable Contributions in the Twin Cities, 197981, 1987-89, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 445 (1997).
134. See supra Part I.A.3.
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authority, managers need to invest more in maintaining influence (a
demand-side explanation). Unregulated managerial discretion over prosocial expenditures is therefore more likely to be used in such contexts as
another tool to influence key players, whose support managers need more
when threatened from within.
Indeed, a recent study found that managerial entrenchment is positively
correlated with corporate social performance levels and that this effect is
more strongly pronounced when the internal governance mechanisms (such
as board monitoring) are strong.135 This pattern suggests that managers
who need to use explicit anti-takeover measures to fend off external
governance threats also use pro-sociality as implicit anti-takeover measures
to fend off internal governance threats.136 While more robust evidence is
needed on the potential channels for managers to use profit sacrificing to
relax constraints, it seems that there is already enough to raise concerns and
necessitate a rethinking of the legal implications.
IV. THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE
A. The Current Legal Landscape
The current legal control of CP has been reviewed extensively
elsewhere.137 This section summarizes legal regulation of CP, with
subsequent sections more fully evaluating current and proposed laws.
Every state has a statute explicitly granting corporations the power to
engage in CP.138 But such statutes provide little guidance. How do we
determine whether this power is exercised properly? The common law
answer evolved in a way that allows wide discretion for managers in
making CP decisions.139 The courts suppose that donations are done with
some long-term benefit for the company in mind.140 As no direct benefit is
required, managers can practically always justify profit sacrifices by
alluding to some indirect benefit. The only constraint on CP in Delaware
law is that the donation should be reasonable. “Reasonable” is interpreted
extremely broadly; as long as the donation meets the criteria for tax
deduction, it will not be questioned.141
This brings us to tax law’s treatment of CP. I.R.C. § 170 allows a tax
deduction for CP, effectively reducing its costs at the rate of the top
marginal income tax of the company. Donations qualify for deduction
under § 170 as long as they meet three criteria: they must be no bigger than
135. See Surroca & Tribó, supra note 22, at 748–49.
136. See generally Maretno A. Harjoto & Hoje Jo, Corporate Governance and CSR
Nexus, 100 J. BUS. ETHICS 45 (2011) (analyzing the association between entrenchment
indices and corporate social performance); Surroca & Tribó, supra note 22.
137. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 3; Kahn, supra note 55.
138. See Elhauge, supra note 3, at 867–68.
139. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581
(N.J. 1953); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398 (Utah 1958).
140. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg., 98 A.2d at 590.
141. See Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 405.
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10 percent of taxable income, made to a recognized 501(c)(3) organization,
and intended as a “gift,” defined as being made without expectation of quid
pro quo.142 Essentially, the current legal approach is a hybrid: corporate
law authorities allow donations by invoking a long-term benefits
explanation, while tax authorities allow donations by invoking an altruistic
explanation.
Aside from tax laws, CP is not subject to significant federal regulation.
In particular, CP is not subject to a specific disclosure requirement. It is not
captured by the general disclosure criteria either; because donations are
almost never significant in terms of their size relative to the company’s
resources, they are not captured by the materiality requirements of the
securities laws or accounting standards (while expenditures will be reflected
in the overall balance, they will not be itemized separately in financial
reports).143 Furthermore, shareholders cannot use their rights of access to
information to learn about CP.144 Still, there is some limited treatment of
“interested” donations: the New York Stock Exchange listing rules demand
that a listed company that donates over one million dollars to a tax-exempt
organization affiliated with an independent director must disclose this
contribution.145 Delaware courts have indirectly addressed this issue as
well. When analyzing the independence of special litigation committee
members, the Delaware Chancery has considered philanthropic ties between
the company and the CP recipient institution employing the directors.146
A summary of CP laws would not be complete without alluding to the
related, timely issue of corporate political donation laws. Citizens United
142. Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, The Nature
of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 35–45
(1994).
143. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 114, at 989; Kahn, supra note 55, at 582–83 nn.7–8.
There are exceptions where CP is counted as part of executive compensation, as in
“director[s’] legacies” contributions. See id. at 610–11, 624.
144. Narrow interpretation of such statutory rights deems them inapplicable for attaining
CP information. See Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1132–33; Benjamin E. Ladd,
Note, A Devil Disguised as a Corporate Angel?: Questioning Corporate Charitable
Contributions to “Independent” Directors’ Organizations, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2153,
2187 n.196 (2005).
145. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02(b), available at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manua
l=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F. Note that this is a watered-down version, an
exception to the criterion for “independence”: if a company engages with the director’s
business organization in a transaction of the magnitude of one million dollars (or 2 percent
of the organization’s revenues), then the director is no longer considered “independent.” But
if similar amounts are being transferred by the company to the director’s charitable
organization, the director is still considered independent. The NASDAQ listing rules are
more stringent in this respect. See Ladd, supra note 144, at 2169–70 (also analyzing the main
limitations of such regulations, including ineffective enforcement and the possibility of sidestepping the rules). For more on the unwillingness of stock exchanges to enforce such
issues, see Lin, supra note 27, at 29 n.115 and accompanying text. I have researched NYSE
filings and have not located a single case of disclosure of such an interested donation.
Several companies regularly report explicitly that no such donation was made.
146. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 932–33 (Del. Ch. 2003).
While this case signals that courts see CP ties as an issue, without mandatory disclosure the
possibility to deter interested CP ex ante is limited. See infra Part IV.B.
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relaxed the historical ban on political donations.147 In the wake of this
decision, proposals are now before Congress to significantly regulate
political donations. The logic is that once historic bans are removed,
managers cannot be left with unfettered discretion as if political donations
were ordinary business expenditures; rather, mechanisms need to be put in
place that will protect shareholders’ interests.148 Thus, the discussion of
“regular” donations can inform the discussion of explicit corporate political
spending, and vice versa.
B. Evaluating Current and Proposed Laws
As noted, CP practices exist in a regulatory vacuum. The laws evolved
to grant wide discretion to sacrifice profits pro-socially, without affording
investors the means to control this discretion, such as by mandatory
disclosure.149 In this section, I build on my analysis in previous parts to
assess the fit between the observed and the theoretically optimal modes of
regulating CP.
What can we learn from the previous discussion? Part I analyzed the
complexities of CP and the incomplete empirical picture of corporate
giving. Despite these mixed results, there are still some relevant general
implications. We can conclude that there is no financial penalty for CP. A
blanket legal ban on all CP expenditures cannot be justified on economic
grounds. If CP is indeed value-enhancing, then there is little reason to
intervene in the name of corporate governance. Yet, we also know that CP
is not just value-driven. The logic of incentives and the evidence (once
purely anecdotal, but now more systematic) suggest that managerial
discretion can be used, under certain circumstances, to benefit managers at
shareholders’ expense. Such indications suggest that while a total ban is
unwarranted, we also cannot afford to ignore CP completely. Those
opposing legal intervention frequently respond that, while some donations
are indeed about managerial self-aggrandizement at the expense of
shareholders, those are only isolated cases of relatively small magnitude
that do not merit intervention.
My analysis in Part III sheds light on the problems that arise from
continuing to ignore CP. First, we should not be quick to dismiss anecdotal
evidence of abuse as merely anecdotes; CP is currently not subject to
disclosure, so the scope of the phenomenon might be more alarming than
we are allowed to observe. Second, even relatively small amounts of
managerial-driven CP, which are not troubling by themselves, can serve as
early warnings of suboptimal diversion of corporate resources by managers
for their own interests.150 The result is that disclosure of CP might have
spillover benefits that go beyond direct effects of the donations on the
bottom line. Third, in the subset of cases in which managerial-driven CP
147.
148.
149.
150.

See 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1146.
See Barnard, supra note 17, at 1174–77.
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not only reflects existing agency costs but also generates additional agency
costs, the case for legal intervention is much stronger. Failure to address
agency problems in CP decisions might make it more difficult to address
agency problems in other corporate decisions.151
But saying that something must be done just begins the analysis. The
question is what exactly to do. We need to make a preliminary choice
between two basic options: either we try to target and ban those CP
decisions that are bad for the company and allow all others, or else we
refrain from direct interference with CP decisions and rather supply
protective mechanisms that will facilitate market control. This is where the
discussion on the value-enhancing aspects of CP in Part II can help. It
highlights the futility of trying to distinguish bad from good—that is, profitenhancing from profit-reducing donations. Shareholders and courts are
unable to eliminate bad CP decisions based on the existence of clear signs
of quid pro quo, or professed insiders’ motivations. The asymmetric
information angle suggests that profit sacrificing may still be valueenhancing.152 It thus strengthens the argument that targeted bans are
impractical and unwarranted—another reason for us to leave profitsacrificing discretion to managers, and to focus instead on less intrusive
protective mechanisms. The following sections evaluate two such options,
requiring disclosure and mandating shareholder involvement.
1. Requiring Disclosure?
The lack of any substantive disclosure requirement has not gone
unnoticed or unquestioned. Proposals for legislation have been brought up
frequently in Congress and the corporate and securities law literature over
the past fifteen years.153 A fairly common denominator in those proposals
is the call for two types of disclosure: targeted disclosure of “interested”
donations to NGOs affiliated with directors, and general disclosure both of
total amounts given yearly and of beneficiaries receiving sums over a
certain threshold. Yet those proposals, even the modest ones, never made it
into law. For example, the House of Representatives version of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act contained a CP-disclosure requirement, but it was
omitted from the final Act.154 Below we try to assess whether this is
justified.
151. Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 91 (in the context of political donations).
152. The benefits from signaling will outweigh agency costs from managerial utilitydriven donations only when the weight placed on the short-run improvement—generated by
the elicited response of outsiders updating their valuation—outweighs any extra surplus
captured by the manager.
153. See the representative proposal in H.R. 3745, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002), which
was later duplicated in subsequent Congresses. See also Barnard, supra note 17, at 1169–70;
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct that Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain:
Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1, 22–25 (1998);
Kahn, supra note 55; Richard W. Painter, Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1219, 1228 (2002).
154. See H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 7 (2d Sess. 2002).

1928

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

The pros of requiring CP disclosure are intuitive. Firms cannot be
expected to voluntarily provide sufficient and comparable information on
their pro-social activities, due to agency and coordination problems.155
First, when left on their own, insiders will have incentives to provide biased
disclosure, whether by exaggerating the positive aspects of donations or by
camouflaging the negative aspects. Mandatory disclosure could serve as an
early warning by flushing out cases of self-aggrandizement, as well as
reducing the ability of managers to use CP as a co-optation device to bypass
existing restrictions on board independence, political spending, or antitakeover measures.156 Second, mandatory disclosure would standardize
both the form and the substance of the information, thereby allowing
comparability and increasing the value of information to outsiders.
Commentators direct less attention to the cons of mandatory CP
disclosure. The legislative history of proposed bills reveals a basic set of
three recurring arguments against disclosure: (1) the costs of implementing
disclosure; (2) the negative impact of an expected chilling effect on overall
CP; and (3) the marginal benefits of regulated disclosure—the relevant
information is already public and/or no one is interested in it.157
The first argument invokes several types of disclosure costs: actual
costs, like compiling and disseminating data, and indirect costs, like
overwhelming investors (that is, additional information dilutes the value of
existing information). Those arguments may hold on paper, but in practice,
introducing a new disclosure requirement will not add significantly to the
mix of costs already incurred. Firms are required to report the levels and
targets of certain donations to the IRS, so no compiling costs would be
added.158 Since large firms disseminate information about their pro-social
behavior to the public via company websites and separate, lengthy
corporate social responsibility reports (CSR reports),159 no disseminating
costs will be added either. Finally, acknowledging this steady flow of
social responsibility information discredits the “overwhelming investors
with information” argument as well. On the contrary, because the mass of
public information is presented in a distorted, non-standardized, and non155. Cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 278–79 (2d ed.
2009).
156. Such an argument stresses the role of mandatory disclosure in reducing agency costs
(not just the accurate pricing-enhancement role). See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory
Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
157. See, e.g., Increasing Disclosure to Benefit Investors, supra note 87.
158. See Kahn, supra note 55, at 586 n.20. A stronger version of this argument would
object to the targeted disclosure proposed, claiming that companies are not able to
continuously keep an eye on which NGO boards the officers are currently sitting. But
officers already provide extensive disclosure of various affiliations, so this could hardly be
counted as a significant added cost of disclosure. Moreover, such an objection does not hold
against the proposed general disclosure requirement (disclosing overall amount and large
individual donations).
159. On the prevalence of CSR reports among large companies, see, for example, KPMG,
International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 13–20 (2008),
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Interna
tional-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf; see also Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127,
at 1143 (for a similar argument on the low costs of disseminating online).
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transparent manner (anecdotes instead of comparable numbers, forcing
readers to wind through the maze of long CSR reports),160 any requirement
that companies publicize a standardized and concise form, such as a single
number of overall donations, will not muddy the waters but rather
crystallize them.
It is more difficult to dismiss the second “chilling effect” argument
because of its abstract nature. Without previous experience with mandatory
CP disclosure, we have no evidence of the consequences of disclosure.
Those concerned about a potential chilling effect rest their criticism on two
assumptions. First, that disclosure will decrease overall CP, and second,
that benefits to shareholders from deterrence of bad CP decisions will be
dwarfed by the negative impact on the non-profit sector.
These
assumptions are supported by neither logic nor evidence.
To understand why, consider the different categories and motivations of
CP. Donations motivated by buying goodwill or signaling are not likely to
be deterred by disclosure. Currently, information about corporate prosociality exists in an environment where virtually all companies profess to
be nice and disseminate long and anecdotal CSR reports. In this
environment, companies can easily exaggerate their goodness because a
threat of legal liability for exaggeration is extremely remote. A threat of
market sanction is also very limited since information on pro-sociality is not
readily verifiable.161 Companies that actually invest heavily in pro-sociality
find it hard to distinguish themselves from those who merely pretend to be
generous. This cheap talk environment leads outsiders to discount
information about corporate pro-sociality, and leads insiders to invest in
marketing rather than actual philanthropic impact. In other words, prosocial activities are picked for their window-dressing value.
Regulated disclosure could lead to less cacophony, and less cacophony
could lead to more incentives to engage in meaningful pro-social profit
sacrificing. Disclosure would thus not decrease CP. To the contrary, it
would likely increase both doing good, because incentives to exaggerate
goodness will decrease, and doing well, because outsiders are likely to be
better informed about corporate goodness.
The next step in evaluating the chilling effect argument is to consider the
effect on bad, managerial utility-driven CP. Here, it is more intuitive to
speculate that disclosure would indeed decrease donations, and the question
is whether this is a good thing for society. Proponents of the chilling
argument could claim that the loss to the non-profit sector from decreased
funds outweighs shareholder gains from decreased perk-like donations

160. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Considerations of overwhelming
investors do not eliminate the need for standardized disclosure. At most, they point to
directions for designing the disclosure requirement.
161. On the lack of implicit assurance via litigation threats for non-financial reporting (as
opposed to financial reporting), see Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., Voluntary Non-financial
Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility
Reporting 9–10 (Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1343453.
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because shareholder gains are supposed to be nominal. Managers will
simply substitute this discretionary expenditure for another (for example,
move from CP to ineffective operational profit sacrificing or traditional
perks). As Part III clarifies, however, this neutral-value-diversion argument
ignores the possibility that CP is not only self-aggrandizing, but also
potentially co-opting. Co-opting donations have the effect of bypassing
existing restrictions and are thus ones that society (and probably also
shareholders as a group) wants to deter.162 The only category in which the
chilling argument’s assumptions might hold is that of CP decisions driven
by managerial self-aggrandizement.
But even with self-aggrandizing donations, both assumptions on which
the chilling effect argument rests are shaky. It is not clear that disclosure
would decrease self-aggrandizing donations. If the point behind them is to
bolster managers’ images or intrinsic benefits, then perhaps disclosure
would trigger a race among managers to be perceived as the biggest donor,
a “ratcheting-up” effect where no CEO wants to be seen as below-average
in pro-social engagement. After all, this was the result of introducing new
disclosure requirements in related areas such as managerial perks.163
Furthermore, even if disclosure would somewhat decrease self-aggrandizing
donations, it is not clear that the losses to the non-profit sector outweigh all
the other benefits.164
Across all different categories of CP, the chilling argument’s two
assumptions do not hold: disclosure is unlikely to decrease donations that
do good, and it enables doing well; the only donations it is likely to
decrease are those that do bad. In any case, even if the effects of disclosure

162. There is a general argument in favor of CP disclosure, which goes beyond corporate
and securities law considerations. We have already discussed election law justifications for
CP disclosure. Another notable example is the perverse effects pharmaceutical CP can have
on medical care, recently addressed by the Sunshine Act. See Rick Cohen, Shenanigans of
Corporate
Grantmaking,
NONPROFIT
Q.
(Jan.
31,
2008),
http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=288:sh
enanigans-of-corporate-grantmaking&catid=149:rick-cohen&Itemid=991. The upshot is
that instead of putting a finger in the dike whenever perverse effects of CP abuse are being
detected ex post in one context or another, we should increase transparency of profitsacrificing activities altogether.
163. See Yaniv Grinstein et al., The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure 17–18
(Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series No. 06-2011, Apr. 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108707. To be sure, one can claim that
a ratcheting-up competition for more profit sacrificing would be a bad thing for shareholders
and perhaps even for overall welfare. But I raise my argument as a rebuttal against the
assumption of disclosure opponents, according to which disclosure of discretionary
resources necessarily leads to fewer expenditures. One could argue that in CP, unlike in
executive pay or perks, it is less likely that disclosure would lead to ratcheting up because
there are fewer incentives for insiders to keep engaging in the disclosed activity when facing
increased market or social control. The level of private benefits for every dollar spent on CP
is probably lower than the private benefits from every dollar spent on perks, not to mention
on direct salary. Whether we subscribe to this prediction or not depends on our
understanding of what causes ratcheting-up effects.
164. For one, there is an argument in favor of submitting perk-like donations to the same
disclosure requirements that are applied to traditional perks.
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on overall levels of CP are uncertain, it is still likely to better align
corporate pro-sociality with shareholder value.
The third and final objection to requiring disclosure of CP posits that the
benefits from introducing disclosure are insignificant and are unlikely to
outweigh the costs. Proponents of this objection maintain that investors are
not interested in information about CP, and those investors who are
interested can assemble the relevant pieces of public information without
needing costly regulatory intervention. In support of this claim, opponents
of disclosure invoke the relative dearth of shareholder litigation and
proposals on the matter.165 But all we can really conclude from such
evidence is that shareholders are not interested in the information currently
available. Naturally, the abuse of profit-sacrificing expenditures will not be
disclosed voluntarily, so shareholders and regulators cannot act upon them
ex ante. A more relevant question is whether the managers of Enron and
RJR Nabisco could have freely used CP as a co-optation device if there had
been a disclosure requirement in place at the time.166
The argument that outsiders can already get CP information through
existing sources is also flawed, if only because it unrealistically assumes a
competitive market for corporate social responsibility information. The
conditions for an “unraveling” effect—where firms voluntarily disclose all
private information on their pro-sociality for fear that outsiders will assume
the worst if information is not fully disclosed—do not hold in our
context.167
For example, misrepresentation is not costly, because
information is unverifiable and subject to very little legal scrutiny.168
165. See generally Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127.
166. See id. at 1143; see also supra notes 118, 151 and accompanying text. In general,
invoking the low number of litigations or shareholder proposals to suggest that disclosure is
unnecessary ignores how the current legal regime affects the revealed preferences of
shareholders. For example, courts have made it clear that challenges to CP decisions are
bound to be rejected even when the donations are clearly self-aggrandizing and comprise
one-third of the annual profits; and it was traditionally unclear whether the SEC allows
shareholders to use the proxy mechanism to bring forth decisions related to the subject. See
Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1123–24. All this makes it costly for shareholders to
challenge CP practices.
167. On the conditions for the “unraveling” effect, see Anne Beyer et al., The Financial
Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296, 300–15
(2010); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 682–85 (1984) (discussing the “unraveling”
effect in securities law).
168. Note that the transparency needed also might regard future profit-sacrificing
behavior, so it would be very difficult to assess the integrity of a manager’s disclosure. Cf.
Jason Scott Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of
Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance 35, 74 (John F. Kennedy Sch.
of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Corp. Soc. Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_14_
johnston.pdf.
A similar argument against regulated disclosure could invoke my own signaling
analysis. See generally Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets:
Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL
REGULATION 177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). If indeed CP brings with it benefits of
mitigating asymmetric information, then disclosure need not be mandated. Companies
wanting to distinguish themselves as high quality will disclose credibly and sufficiently. But
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Indeed, while most large companies generate detailed CSR reports, these
reports achieve no real transparency.169 Social responsibility information
intermediaries also fail to generate sufficient, credible information, if only
because they do not enjoy superior access to relevant information.170 In
any case, sending outsiders to piece together bits of information is
unrealistic and ineffective; companies are better positioned to supply this
information in a complete, comparable, and timely manner.171
The lack of reliable information also answers the generic critique against
regulatory intervention that shareholders are free to sort their investments
based on their approval or disapproval of pro-social policies. It is not only
that shareholders have many other factors according to which they sort
companies. Even if shareholders do want to sort based on CP, they cannot
do it effectively without mandatory disclosure. In an uninformative “cheap
talk” environment, practically all companies profess to be nice, and no
manager professes to abuse CP money to entrench herself, so outsiders
cannot distinguish between nice guys and pretenders.
A common theme in these arguments against disclosure is that they do
not account enough for how laws affect the baseline. While corporate prosociality is very much controlled by market forces, the presence of market
control does not mean that legal control is meaningless, because the
existing legal regime influences market forces. Specifically, market control
relies on information flow, and the law affects how information flows.172
Against the background of the lack of legal standards governing pro-social
disclosure, voluntary reports by firms fail to generate transparency.
Similarly, corporate social responsibility information intermediaries cannot
be assumed to produce satisfying results on their own without
standardization of metrics, credible third-party liability threat, or access to
comparable information.173 Legal control of the flow of information—that
is, requiring standardized reporting form and substance, and establishing a
liability threat for falsely communicating or failing to report—could thus be
beneficial for both shareholders and stakeholders by reducing managerial

even if we assume that meaningful signaling “pressures” are at work (remember that our
refinements suggested that signaling is rather coarse), then signal selection can be expected
to operate mostly on the level of donations, and less on the targets. In our example, outsiders
pay more attention to how much cash companies dispose of when donating, and less to
where exactly this cash is being disposed.
169. Cf. Porter & Kramer, supra note 29, at 81.
170. See Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1142–43 n.131; supra Part I.A.4.
Moreover, without legal intervention it is less likely that those private intermediaries could
deter abuse of CP money sufficiently, since their ratings focus more on levels of CP, rather
than on targets (and it is the choice of targets that generates the ability to use CP as a cooptation mechanism).
171. Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 106.
172. See Johnston, supra note 168; see also Lin, supra note 27, at 27.
173. After all, the same factors that created a need to regulate the market for financial
information intermediaries (for example, possible collusion with monitored companies) are
also likely to operate in the social information intermediaries market. For example,
considerations of competition for clients and pressures from interest groups could dictate
adopting overly wide metrics. See Johnston, supra note 168.
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agency costs and allowing firms to credibly commit to pro-sociality with
real impact.
To be sure, we cannot expect disclosure to be a panacea for all negative
aspects of CP. For disclosure to be justified, it must have a real potential to
induce readers to act on the disclosed information and change the behavior
of the disclosing entity for the better.174 In our case, for example, it could
be claimed that the amounts spent are not significant enough to elicit a
response.175 Another concern is that subjecting this voluntary “charitable”
practice to a new disclosure requirement would crowd out motivation, and
tame the practice in the eyes of outsiders and insiders.176
Yet, we should not overstate these concerns. For one, disclosure can play
a role in greasing the wheels of corporate governance even when the
amounts involved in suspicious transactions are not material by
themselves.177 Perhaps the best answer to these concerns is to proceed
cautiously: first mandate some form of limited disclosure, then gather
information on the regulations’ effects and CP practices, and finally
reassess the consequences of regulation and alter it if necessary.178
A distinct question is why proposals that would require disclosure of CP
continue to be rejected. Indeed, we saw that the commonly raised
objections do not have enough merit to justify the current regulatory
vacuum. A full answer to this question would require a separate article, so I
will only briefly sketch some conjectures based on congressional hearings
and personal interviews. Lack of regulation can be attributed to a mixture
of three main causes. First, some policymakers still hold the outdated belief
that pro-social sacrifices are not big enough to merit costly intervention.179
Second, policymakers are reluctant to be perceived as thwarting
philanthropy, which is “as American as apple pie,” and so turn a blind eye
174. See generally Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects
of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (noting that disclosing
conflicts of interest can have perverse effects, such as making the disclosing agent feel
morally licensed); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (noting that more
information is not necessarily better; it depends on whether users can process that
information effectively).
175. Cf. Sugin, supra note 44, at 140 (noting that shareholders “would be unlikely to
make ownership decisions based on the corporation’s decision to give away a very small
percentage of the company’s profits”).
176. See generally Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules:
Expressive Law and CEO Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207 (2008) (requiring enhanced
disclosure of executive pay will send a message that pay without performance should invite
disapproval (i.e., laws affecting social norms)).
177. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 155, at 280–81. Indeed, evidence suggests that
disclosure of other expenditures thought to be reflecting or generating agency problems leads
to a negative stock price impact far larger than the expenditure itself. See, e.g., Grinstein et
al., supra note 163. Anecdotally, when it was discovered that Tyco donated a large amount
to an independent director’s preferred charity, the firm’s stock price fell. Bohnen & Phillips,
supra note 120, at 39.
178. Cf. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251,
309–12 (2005).
179. See Increasing Disclosure to Benefit Investors, supra note 87.
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to the supposedly insignificant dangers it brings.180 Third, unsurprisingly,
there are private interests at play.
One usual suspect for killing disclosure proposals is the strong
managerial lobby, whose interest is to protect managers’ unfettered
discretion. After all, while both shareholders and stakeholders may fare
better under mandatory disclosure, managers might fare worse—one covert
channel for managerial influence on key players will be hampered.181 A
closer look reveals additional, less intuitive suspects possibly pushing
against disclosure. Incumbent politicians who are currently enjoying this
subtle channel for corporate money have incentives to keep CP in the dark
in order to evade restrictions on explicit corporate funding.182 More
interestingly, charitable organizations themselves oppose disclosure
proposals. There is a strange divide in the non-profit sector over the matter:
while some organizations publicly support disclosure, leaders of the
mainstream foundations and associations are vocal in their resistance.183
Publicly, they profess their concern that disclosure would yield a chilling
effect, but perhaps there is a cynical flavor to their opposition; what those
players care about might not be the level of overall CP, but rather the share
of CP directed at their own specific non-profits. They might fear that
disclosure would hinder their advantage in influencing corporate insiders
behind closed doors.
2. Additional Protective Mechanisms
In the political donations context, recent calls to mandate protective
mechanisms other than disclosure focused specifically on mandatory
shareholder involvement.184 Should this be the case with all donations, not
just the explicitly political ones? In the past, legislatures and academics

180. See the comments made in that spirit by a former SEC chairman, academics, and
practitioners in Balotti & Hanks, supra note 114, at 991, 996; Richard C. Breeden, Giving It
Away: Observations on the Role of the SEC in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Charity, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1997); Symposium, supra note 53, at 1324–25.
181. This is similar to arguments made in the CP-as-antitakeover-mechanism articles:
when requirements of accountability become stronger and more explicit, firms can credibly
commit to pro-sociality and the importance of a specific incumbent manager’s commitment
is reduced. See Cespa & Cestone, supra note 129.
182. See Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation,
34 GA. L. REV. 745, 769 & n.118 (2000).
183. See E-mail from Pablo Eisenberg, Senior Fellow, Ctr. for Pub. & Nonprofit
Leadership, Georgetown Univ., to Author (Apr. 25, 2011, 4:30 PM) (on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Marion Fremont-Smith, Senior Research Fellow, Hauser Ctr. for
Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ. (Apr. 11, 2011); Rick Cohen, Enron’s Philanthropic
Misdeeds, DMIBLOG (Aug. 1, 2006, 12:48 PM), http://www.dmiblog.com/archives/2006/08/
enrons_philanthropic_misdeeds.html
(“The
lobbyists
against
increased
disclosure . . . weren’t corporations, it was the leadership of the nation’s mainstream
foundation and nonprofit trade associations, somehow thinking that the portion of legitimate
corporate philanthropy foundations hand out might be sacrificed if the nation cracked down
on the shadier elements of corporate giving.”).
184. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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proposed mandatory shareholder votes on CP.185 These proposals rested on
the CP model of Warren Buffett’s company, Berkshire Hathaway, where
management set the levels of CP and shareholders designated the targets.
But those proposals drew elaborate criticism, and in retrospect Berkshire
Hathaway’s experiment provides an argument against shareholder
involvement. Berkshire Hathaway terminated its CP program when
subsidiaries of the company were boycotted because shareholders
designated controversial organizations as beneficiaries.186
There are additional arguments to explain why a shareholder vote, even if
justified in the specific context of political donations, is not justified in the
broader context of CP. First, consider the impact it would have on the
bottom line. Logic and evidence suggest that the choice of targets impacts
possible benefits accruing to the company from CP. It is likely that
managers will be better positioned than dispersed shareholders to identify
such benefits and act accordingly.187 By contrast, with political donations,
the benefits are the type that can secure a seat at the table, make sure the
company is being heard, or promote the politician or policy that is most
likely to further the corporate interests. Shareholders are thus more likely
to be able to designate or approve targets for effective political spending.
To oversimplify: in non-political donations, the daunting task is to identify
which stakeholders prefer what causes, which stakeholders are more
important to the company at the moment, and which policy will draw
attention and get attributed to the right motives; in political donations, the
(less daunting) task is to identify who is in power or who promotes policies
that favor the company.188
Second, some claim that in the political donations context, shareholder
involvement could also mitigate “expressive harms,” that is, reduce the
costs of being associated with donations to causes opposed to shareholder
preferences and beliefs.189 While this argument could hold for political
donations, it is less plausible for CP in general. Political purposes are
bound to be polarized and of a zero-sum character, regardless of who is
making the decision (spending on right-wing causes hurts the expressive
185. See, e.g., H.R. 945, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997); Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell,
Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191 (2002).
186. See Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway, to
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 27, 2004), in 2003 Annual Report,
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 21–22 (2003), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2003ar/
2003ar.pdf.
187. See Painter, supra note 153, at 1219.
188. In general, to justify invoking the costly mechanism of a shareholder vote one needs
to rely on some underlying theory of corporate voting. If the supposed expected benefits of
shareholder involvement come from information-aggregating and error-correcting aspects,
then CP is not a good context to require a shareholder vote. See generally Robert B.
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 144–52 (2009). In
such a scenario, information-aggregating is unlikely advantageous, as the condition of
consensus among aggregators on the right policy (of targets) does not hold (Berkshire
Hathaway’s shareholders designated 3,500 different charities. See Sugin, supra note 44, at
166.). Effective monitoring through being attentive to stock prices is also unlikely here
because the stock price impact of CP is small.
189. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 5, at 95–97.
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interests of those supporting leftist causes).190 In the non-political
donations context, however, giving shareholders power to designate targets
can actually be expected to generate more expressive harms. Evidence
suggests that manager-designated donations usually steer clear of extreme,
expressive-ideological, polarized, or religious targets, while those targets
are exactly the ones favored by shareholders.191 Taking into account
expressive harms, advocates for this proposal should not push toward a
shareholder vote. 192
I have focused on the impact on shareholders, both financially and
expressively. But it could be claimed that one should also consider the
impact on non-shareholders, such as the non-profit sector. Shareholder vote
proponents argue that deferring to shareholder preferences will channel CP
money toward more diverse social goals and generate more utility from the
virtuous feelings of donors. 193 Yet such arguments are problematic, as has
been shown elsewhere. 194 Notably, they ignore the possibility that giving
shareholders a say on targets will decrease the overall level of CP: a
shareholder vote is likely to decrease the level of profit-enhancingmotivated donations because managers would not want to risk outraging
stakeholders with a choice of controversial targets, such as occurred with
the abrupt termination of CP at Berkshire Hathaway. A shareholder vote is
also likely to decrease the level of managerial utility-motivated CP—
managers gain fewer private benefits when they cannot designate targets,
and are thus likely to drop the percentage of discretionary resources they
allocate to CP. 195
Overall, the corporate governance concerns raised by CP should not be
overstated. There are other agency problems more urgent than misuse of
pro-social discretion. The legal system does not need to interfere too much
with existing practices. At the same time, misuses of CP could be
indicative of agency problems and, when used in tandem with other cooptation devices, could generate agency problems. Introducing a limited
form of the less restrictive protective mechanism—mandatory disclosure—
may therefore be the best option. Whatever form of regulation is
introduced, careful attention has to be paid to its expressive aspects.
Intervention should be couched as not interfering with voluntary sacrifices
190. Some types of political spending can be in the economic interests of all shareholders,
as they might be directed at gaining more favorable industry or firm-specific regulation. But
since Bebchuk and Jackson target different types of political spending, my argument also
tackles those different types.
191. Again, the Berkshire Hathaway experience is a case in point. See supra note 186 and
accompanying text.
192. If anything, taking into account expressive harms lends more support to requiring
disclosure as a way of preventing the risk that, when kept in the dark, CP can turn into subtle
political spending and favor the ideologies of the managers.
193. See Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 185, at 1207.
194. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 153; Craig M. Sasse & Ryan T. Trahan, Rethinking the
New Corporate Philanthropy, 50 BUS. HORIZONS 29, 34–35 (2007).
195. Managers who decrease those CP expenditures will probably substitute it with other
expenditures. Whether this substitution is worse in overall welfare terms is another question.
Cf. Elhauge, supra note 3, at 796–814.
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and not taming corporate pro-sociality, so as not to crowd out motivations
and erode benefits arising from signaling. 196
CONCLUSION
This Article aims at advancing our understanding of corporate prosociality and sketching initial policy implications. We should focus more
on informational benefits stemming from corporate profit sacrificing in
order to understand what outsiders learn when they observe companies
behaving pro-socially. We should also keep an eye on how unfettered
discretion over pro-social expenditures could generate governance
problems. Acknowledging both of those oft-unnoticed elements then
strengthens the case for introducing some form of standardized mandatory
disclosure.
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. The first
and primary contribution is shifting the focus of value-enhancing
explanations of CP from a buying-goodwill approach to a signaling
approach.
Companies engage in pro-sociality not only because
stakeholders like that companies are nice, but also because pro-sociality
sends a favorable message about the company’s fundamentals. The second
theoretical contribution is the shift of focus from a “managerial perk
approach” to a “co-optation approach” to agency costs explanations of CP.
Managerial self-aggrandizing donations might be problematic, but coopting donations are even more detrimental and necessitate legal
intervention. The third contribution is to emphasize a shift of focus from a
traditional “hands-off” approach to the legal implications of CP in order to
strengthen the case for disclosure.
These three contributions are based on straightforward intuitions. First,
the notion that corporate pro-sociality is signaling is based on the intuition
that to understand why corporations engage in pro-sociality, one needs to
understand why anyone behaves pro-socially. 197 Signaling plays an
increasingly important role in explaining individual pro-sociality, and there
is all the more reason to apply it to the corporate context: this is a relatively
competitive, impersonal context, filled with asymmetric information and
high-powered incentives to cheat in communication. It is time, therefore,
that we switch from emotional and cognitive explanations for corporate
cooperative behavior and focus more on signaling aspects. 198 Note that I
am not suggesting that signaling is the sole or even the main driver of CP
behavior, or that insiders carefully contemplate signaling with CP levels.
My narrower, and thus more intuitive, point is rather that signaling is one
unexplored mechanism through which pro-sociality could advance the
196. Cf. POSNER, supra note 77, at 176 (noting that external intervention can cause
unintended consequences, such as pushing signalers to signal in a worse way, or to stop
signaling and therefore lose some of the ability to mitigate asymmetric information).
197. See Henderson & Malani, supra note 25, at 572.
198. See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 97, at 789 (showing how, in competitive,
n-person contexts, non-signaling explanations are less likely). See generally Elinor Ostrom,
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (2000).
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bottom line. This intuitive signaling point runs the risk of turning into a
“just so story,” future research is still needed. In particular, we should try
to examine the impact of announcements of major changes in CP policies
on stock prices.
Second, the notion that corporate pro-sociality is a co-optation
mechanism is also based on a simple intuition: if managers can use
discretion over pro-social expenditures to generate managerial perks, they
can also use it to entrench themselves and co-opt the governance
mechanisms that constrain them. It is difficult to determine the true scope
of this corporate governance problem due to the lack of public disclosure:
it could be minor relative to other agency problems. Nevertheless, the
introduction of some form of disclosure could be a reasonable step toward
deterring such misconduct while bolstering signaling and other benefits
arising from CP, at relatively little cost.
Finally, the need to rethink the current hands-off approach to legal
regulation is also intuitive. The current approach is based on the
anachronistic premise that corporate pro-sociality is of little relevance to the
market. Nowadays, strong market incentives shape corporate social
responsibility practices. The legal system needs to acknowledge the impact
it has on those market forces and act accordingly. 199
CP and corporate pro-sociality in general are complex phenomena, thus I
omitted several aspects from this Article for the sake of brevity and clarity.
For example, I did not consider the roles charitable organizations or
corporate foundations play in altering CP behavior. Examining the
beneficiaries of CP, their connections with corporate decision makers, and
their use of CP money could help us better understand both potential
agency problems and benefits from signaling. 200 Similarly, elaborating on
donations channeled through corporate foundations could affect analysis;
giving through foundations tends to be more stable, is reported to the IRS in
forms accessible to the public, and is ostensibly less susceptible to CEOs’
influence. Those differences matter for all sorts of CP implications—
buying goodwill, signaling information, and generating private benefits. 201
199. Cf. Kahn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 1142; Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities
and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197,
1206, 1284–89 (1999).
200. For example, a situation where the beneficiaries of the signal (NGOs in our case) are
not the same as the receivers (investors) yields a prediction that beneficiaries will try to elicit
excessive altruistic signaling. Cf. Jonathan Wright, Altruism as a Signal: Zahavi’s
Alternative to Kin Selection and Reciprocity, 30 J. AVIAN BIOLOGY 108, 109 (1999).
201. For example, more stability in levels of giving could strengthen profit-enhancing
aspects, because of tax considerations or delegated philanthropy benefits (continuing to look
nice in the eyes of consumers). Indeed, evidence shows that industries subject to more
earnings fluctuations have a greater tendency to establish foundations. See Brown et al.,
supra note 21, at 865–67. It could also be advantageous for the non-profit beneficiaries by
isolating them from ebbs and flows. We should not overstate, however, the benefits from
giving through foundations. First, agency problems at the foundation level might mean that
the cash is hoarded, rather than utilized in the non-profit sector. Second, although reports to
the IRS are open to the public, in reality they are severely delayed. Finally, evidence shows
that CEOs still exert significant influence even when the giving is done via foundations. See
Rick Cohen, Corporate Giving: De-cloaking Stealth Philanthropy, NONPROFIT Q., Sept. 20,
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I also did not address all the normative angles. Suggesting that corporate
pro-sociality might serve as a signal is not the same as saying that CP is
beneficial to overall welfare. Signaling could evolve into a pooling,
uninformative equilibrium. A signaling rat-race could lead managers to
focus on the perceived, instead of the real, impact of their pro-social
expenditures, or to focus more on how to be perceived as nice instead of on
the firm’s fundamentals. Overemphasis on perceived pro-sociality could
also be used as window-dressing, disguising bigger problems. For example,
Enron was a CSR poster child, winning numerous accolades. 202 On the
other hand, signaling with pro-sociality might have a longer-lasting impact
on society than corporate signaling with other, wasteful means. Similarly,
when discussing the expected consequences of disclosure—whether it will
chill, ratchet up, or not affect CP levels—I did not intend to make a
statement on the overall desirability of CP, but rather to show that the
assumptions of the opponents of disclosure are tenuous. Whatever the
overall normative implications are,203 this Article aims to increase
awareness of the informational aspects of pro-sociality, and the impact a
given legal regime has on the market for information.
The new perspective on corporate pro-sociality provided in this Article
could also be built upon to develop new understandings in seemingly
distinct areas of corporate governance literature, in ways that were not
developed here: how companies build a reputation toward outsiders, how
managers instill a corporate culture that facilitates cooperation inside the
corporation, and how insiders mobilize resources to act in the political
sphere. These directions for future research share an underlying theme,
which is also the basis for this Article: the corporate governance literature
has much to gain from a fresh look at corporate pro-sociality.

2002, at 47; see also James D. Werbel & Suzanne M. Carter, The CEO’s Influence on
Corporate Foundation Giving, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 47 (2002).
202. See Robert L. Bradley, Jr., Corporate Social Responsibility and Energy, in 1
CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION 181, 181–82 (Irving Louis Horowitz ed., 2009); Robert Murphy,
Enron, the CSR Poster Child, TOWNHALL (Apr. 26, 2008), http://townhall.com/
columnists/RobertMurphy/2008/04/26/enron,_the_csr_poster_child. For the argument that
pro-sociality serves as disguising corporate misdeeds, see generally Daryl Koehn & Joe
Ueng, Is Philanthropy Being Used by Corporate Wrongdoers to Buy Good Will?, 14 J.
MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2010).
203. Basically, the normative question deals with whether companies enjoy a comparative
advantage over other supporters of societal causes such as non-profits and the government.
See generally Henderson & Malani, supra note 25.

